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NOTES & COMMENTS
CLOSING THE DISCLOSURE GAP IN CORPORATE
TAKE-OVERS: THE WILLIAMS AMENDMENTS
AND THE WHEAT REPORT
The conglomerate corporation 1 has distinguished itself2 in an era
which considers the unusual commonplace. Widely regarded as a prod-
uct of the nefarious "urge to merge," conglomerate growth is, if not
the most common, at least the most notorious expression of recent
intercorporate activity. While the myriad factors giving impetus to
what has so often been termed "merger hyperactivity" surely defies any
form of capsulized treatment, those elements of a more exponential
genre may indeed be more deftly analyzed. This note is one such effort.
If the old adage that "necessity is the mother of invention" were
empirically verifiable, one would need to turn to no other source of
raw datum than the primordial environment of the conglomerate
merger to establish its truth. Inhibited by the vigilant eye of govern-
ment regulation, conglomerates sought, found and exploited more sur-
reptitious, yet equally effective modes of achieving corporate control;
a notable illustration of which subsists in the regulation of corporate
securities.
Coinciding with the recent surge in corporate combinations has
been the increasing popularity of the cash tender offer.3 Designed to
avoid the expense and delay ordinarily attending the exchange offer
and proxy fight, a cash tender offer is an offer by a raider (offeror)5
1 A caveat should be initially expressed. While this note adopts the conglomerate as
a general frame of reference, the inference that the subject matter herein discussed is
peculiar to the conglomerate firm would be clearly erroneous; indeed, the conglomerate
has merely typified and aggravated widespread abuses generally attending corporate
disclosure.
[A conglomerate is] a corporate organization with two principal characteristics:
a largely unrelated multi-product and multi-industry operating base, and an
active acquisition program ...
A Guide for Buying the Conglomerates, 60 MooDY'S STOCK SURVEY 528 (Aug. 19, 1968).
2 See, e.g., A. SMITH, THE MONEY GAME 181-96 (1968); Sauerhaft, Advice from an
Aging Conglomerator to His Nephew Upon Graduating from The Harvard Business
School, DUN'S REv., Nov. 1968, at 37.
B Although the cash tender offer has only acquired prominence in the sixties, it has
been skillfully exercised in the past. The lucrative exploits of Louis E. Wolfson and
Leopold Silberstein attest to the validity of this proposition. See generally L. GOULD, TIE
MANIPULATORS 1-63 (1966).
4 See Manne, Mergers And The Market For Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. ECON. 110
(1965). The widespread popularity of the cash tender offer is attributable to five pre-
miums generally unavailable in other methods of acquisition: secrecy, speed, simplicity,
economy and freedom from regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
484
WILLIAMS AMENDMENTS AND WHEAT REPORT
to purchase for cash, cash and stock or other form of consideration,
some or all of the shares of a "target"(offeree) corporation. While the
cash tender offer itself presents an obvious "gap" in a federal regulatory
scheme, merely supplementing a system of regulation does not invari-
ably provide a panacea which miraculously and perpetually responds
to difficulties as they arise. Clearly, for example, the stock-for-stock
exchange, traditionally the subject of regulation, presents a problem in
the timely disclosure of information. Moreover, certain stock trans-
actions popular in effecting corporate take-overs may be exempt from
disclosure requirements when shareholder votes are conducted. Never-
theless, problems have arisen since "acquisitors" gladly adopt schemes
which are exempt from securities regulation. Consequently, many in-
vestors relying upon inadequate and in some cases no information con-
cerning the transaction blindly deliver their company to the offeror.
TENDER PERSUASION
Aggressive Company wishes to expand its corporate horizons
through diversification. More specifically, Aggressive wishes to take
over a corporation that is already established in an unrelated line
of business. Having surveyed the various prospects, Indolent Corpo-
ration is chosen because it fits well in Aggressive's diversification plan.
From an operational vantage, Indolent is unimpressive and has been
for several years: e.g., profits and sales have shown a mild gain while
the national economy and corporate sales and profits in general have
shown an unprecedented expansion. 6
The corporation also possessed a large liquidity position (that is,
[hereinafter SEC or Commission]. See Hayes & Taussig, Tactics of Cash Takeover Bids,
45 HARv. Bus. Rzv., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135 [hereinafter Hayes & Taussig]. The authors
note that the cash take-over bid replaced the stock-for-stock exchange during the early
sixties. By 1965, cash offers were accounting for the great majority of tenders. The
authors attributed the change to:
1) The superiority of the cash bid over other devices in the event of resistance,
at a time when the supply of willing merger partners [had] shrunk.
2) Increasing corporate liquidity.
3) Readily available credit.
4) A new "respectability" for cash bids.
Id. at 136.
See also Sowards & Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Federal Securities
Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 499, 500-01 (1967).
G The term "raider" is not used in a derogatory sense but rather is intended to de-
note an acquiring corporation on the acquisition trail.
6 Poor performance has generally been equated with entrenched, ineffectual manage-
ment. See Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting
Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1104, 1107 (1969) [hereinafter Defensive Tactics]. Cf.
Manne, Cash Tender Offers For Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DuKE LJ.
231, 236; Comment, Economic Realities Of Cash Tender Offers, 20 MAN L. Rxv. 287,
253-58 (1968).
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while a conservative ratio of cash to liabilities was two-to-one during
this period, Indolent's ratio was four-to-one). It also underutilized its
financial leverage - a large gap was maintained between its net worth
and its debt. Indolent evidenced a management that did not bother
to maximize the investment value of their shareholders' holdings. All
of these factors made Indolent an attractive "target" to Aggressive.
By means of a newspaper advertisement,7 Aggressive offered to buy
a certain amount of Indolent's outstanding shares at a fixed cash price.
The offer would be open for a short period of time, (e.g., two weeks)
and Aggressive retained the option to extend the period. The price
for the tendered shares was slightly greater than present market value
and Aggressive reserved the right to accept or reject shares when the
limit specified was reached. The offer could have been withdrawn if
unfavorable circumstances arose, but the shareholder tendered irre-
vocably.
Indolent's management made no recommendations concerning the
offer; shareholders were neither encouraged nor discouraged to tender
their shares. Consequently, an overwhelming "no confidence" vote was
registered as Aggressive was tendered more shares than they had antic-
ipated. Subsequently, with Aggressive men installed on Indolent's
board of directors, a merger plan was adopted.8
Aggressor companies generally seek "target" companies possessing
stock with stagnant market prices; or whose top executives personally
hold a small amount of outstanding stock; or whose stock is apparently
undervalued by the market; or those operating with any combination
of these factors.9 Once an attractive company is selected, all that the
7 Letters to the shareholders are equally effective, where, of course, the offeror has
access to a shareholders' list. See note 21 in fra.
8 Austin, Anatomy of a Tender Offer, 17 MSU Bus. Topics, Spring 1969, at 63. The
example is adapted from the 1966 take-over of the K.V.P.-Sutherland Paper Company by
the Brown Company. A final touch of irony was added to the situation in 1968 when
Gulf & Western Industries acquired the Brown Company by means of the cash tender
offer. Professor Austin gives a thorough economic analysis of the Brown-K.V.P. take-over.
9 See Rukeyser, Getting Tough with Tenders, FORTUNE, Aug. 1967, at 108; Austin,
supra note 8. See also Anonymous, The Anatomy of a Raid, DUN'S REV., Sept. 1968, at 55
where the author gives the following advice to management of potential "target" com-
panies:
Very broad stockholder ownership of your company makes it easy for a po-
tential raider to quietly pick up your stock while he is forming a base for the
attack.
The absence of any large holdings . . . among... top officers and directors,
means there is no strong ownership group to oppose the raider when he
surfaces ....
Understated assets may fool . . . [the Internal Revenue Service but not]
shrewd Wall Street analysts who may be helping the raider pick his next pigeon.
Inbred corporate managers may complete the noose around your company's
neck, for in their innocence they will find it very difficult to believe that any-
one would want to rope them so boldly.
Id. at 57.
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aggressor need do is place a newspaper advertisement, announcing the
offer at a price which includes a premium above the current market
value.10 A well-conceived plan operates with secrecy; the offeror simply
buys stock on the open market prior to making his bid. As the market
value is lower at this time, the raider can pick up "target" shares cheaply.
Indeed, he may acquire shares sufficient to make him eligible for a
shareholders' list from the "target's" management." Later, in prepara-
tion for the bid, a price must be determined for the tendered shares.' 2
When the price is finally fixed, the remaining terms of the offer weigh
heavily in favor of the offeror. 13 The aggressor must then determine
when, by revealing the offer and subsequently receiving tendered shares
in accordance with his terms, to launch his campaign. The tactic is
relatively fast and cheap and offers maximum satisfaction with mini-
mum abuse.
"Target" Company in the Defense
Although poor performance may be responsible for an impending
attack,14 incumbent management is still in a powerful position, armed
10 See Buying Into a Company Via the Tender Offer, Bus. Wr_ , Feb. 26, 1966, at 38.
The offers generally are contingent upon the offeror's getting enough stock in order to
acquire a firm foothold or control of the "target" company.
11 Purchasing on the open market tends to drive the price of the stock up. Con-
sequently, the offeror may well alert incumbent management of his scheme. However,
the amount accumulated reduces the total number of shares necessary for ultimate
control of the "target."
Knowing when to stop buying on the open market is an important element in
the bidder's strategy. Investment bankers have suggested to us that at least a
month of inactivity should precede a cash tender offer to avoid an undesirable
price advance. An even longer period may be warranted to lull the incumbents
into a false sense of security.
Hayes & Taussig at 129.
See also Rukeyser, supra note 9, at 109; note 58 infra and accompanying text.
12 See Cohen, Tender Offers and Takeover Bids, 23 Bus. LAW. 611 (1968).
[The acquirer's] management must act quickly and secretly on the basis of what-
ever information is publicly available and with continuity of [the target's] man-
agement often in jeopardy, must fix its tender price high enough to assure the
desired response from stockholders and to discourage any competing bid, yet
must not exceed its capacity to obtain temporary and permanent financing, and
in general must act responsibly toward [the acquirer's] own stockholders.
Id. at 613.
It has been noted that a 20 percent premium is the generally subscribed to level,
although lower and higher premiums have been used with some consistency. The Hayes &
Taussig study found the median premium to be 16 percent. See Hayes & Taussig at 139.
13 The offeror generally accepts tendered shares on a "first come, first served" basis.
Accordingly, if the number of shares requested is received before the expiration of the
offer he may refuse to accept the subsequently tendered shares. Typically, he reserves
the right to renege should a specified number of shares not be tendered. See Hayes &
Taussig at 141. Under the New York Stock Exchange rules, the acceptance of shares on
a "first come, first served" basis is not allowed. NEw YoRx SToCK ExCMNGE, CoMPANY
MAN AL, at A-179 (1969). See also Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition By Ten-
der, Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 517, 350 n.124 (1967) [hereinafter Fleischer & Mundheim].
14 See Anonymous, supra note 9.
It used to be said that the corporate raider performs a valuable function in
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with an arsenal of weapons capable of frustrating the take-over bid.' 5
In addition to those preventive defense tactics' of a more remote
nature, such as charter amendments and by-law restrictions,1'7 incum-
bent management may resort to a barrage of tactics having a more im-
mediate strategic and legal impact. For example, where an attractive
"target" has shown poor market performance, the situation may be ad-
justed by announcing a stock split or dividend increase.:' Ordinarily,
the market price of stock will be favorably affected by the announcement
and a renewed confidence in management will be instilled among share-
holders.19 Alternatively, management may consider repurchasing shares
of the company's stock in an effort to decrease the total number of
shares outstanding, thus making it more difficult for the aggressor to
muster a sufficient number of shares to achieve control.20
Following the announcement of a cash tender offer, management
our economy by keeping company management on their toes and forcing them
to do better jobs of running their businesses. That is as much nonsense as say-
ing that the Red Chinese create a healthy atmosphere in the Orient by forcing
the United States to take an interest in the smaller Asian nations.
Id. at 57.
15 Only about one contested tender offer in three has succeeded in giving the bidder
control of the "target" company. See Rukeyser, supra note 9, at 110.
16 Obviously, management should consider remedying those conditions which render
it most vulnerable to a tender offer. See Defensive Tactics at 1107.
17 Typical charter amendments or by-law restrictions include provisions limiting the
percentage of stock to be voted, or requiring an 85 percent vote of the shareholders to
consummate a merger or to amend the charter or by-laws. See generally Defensive Tactics
at 1107-10. See also Abele, Shelters Impede Takeovers, N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1970, § 3
(Business and Finance) at 1, col. 1.
18 But see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8268 (Mar. 7, 1968). Proposed
rule lOb-12 would ensure that "target" companies declaring dividends have a sufficient
cash surplus to support such corporate action.
19 The success of these techniques is contingent upon a reserve of authorized but un-
issued shares. If such additional stock is not readily available and it is necessary to
secure stockholder approval for the issuance, the technique loses its effectiveness. See
Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115, 118 (1967).
Such techniques, as do most techniques, mandate consideration of the anti-fraud
regulations, particularly SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970). If dividend levels
are not maintained after the increase, management will find itself vulnerable to attack
for using a manipulative device in violation of lOb-5. Cf. Cochran v. Channing Corp.,
211 F. Supp. 239, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
20Fraud considerations under rule lOb-5 are paramount when a company is re-
purchasing its own shares. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964);
Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). But see Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-1966 Trans-
fer Binder] CCH FED. Sac. L. REP. f 91,680 (complaint filed Apr. 27, 1966), 91,692
(S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1966) (final consent decree entered). See also Israels, Corporate Pur-
chase of Its Own Shares-Are There New Overtones?, 50 CORNFLL L.Q. 620 (1965) for
a consideration of various state law problems in the area.
A similar method for diluting the raider's holdings is to issue more stock. Since speed
is essential, this tactic must be capable of perpetration without shareholder approval or
registration under the Securities Act of 1933. See Schmults & Kelly, supra note 19, at 119.
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can employ a whole range of remedial defense tactics designed to thwart
the raider's incursions. Management communications, for example,
exhorting prospective shareholders not to tender is perhaps the most
obvious course of action. Generally, this will take the form of a
vigorous publicity campaign criticising both the raider and the raid,
while extolling the virtues of incumbent management. Since manage-
ment has access to the shareholders' list, every shareholder can be
notified of the incumbents' position.21 Moreover, the "target" company
can institute legal action against the enemy, charging fraud or breach
of fiduciary duty. Such suits are rarely upheld but are effective in ar-
resting the momentum of the take-over bid.22 The "target" may resort
to a drastic, yet more effective device by arranging a merger with a
third company; typically a direct competitor of the raider. The anti-
trust implications2 3 are obvious and the company's shareholders may be
impressed by the tax-free aspects of the merger as opposed to the
taxable cash tender offer.24
All things considered, the best defense would appear to be a good
offense. By keeping the company's affairs in good order, the likelihood
of a raid will be greatly diminished, although not completely elim-
inated.25
"RocKs, CAvEs, LAKES, FENS, BOGS, DENS, AND SHADES OF DEATH,..
FEDERAL REGULATION OF CASH TAKE-OVER BiDs
Prior to 1968, there was no federal regulation specifically designed
to deal with cash take-over bids.26 Consequently, aggressor companies
21 Management thus has a considerable advantage over the raider since it has access
to the shareholders' list. While the raider may also be entitled to the list, the incumbents
can delay until the list's value becomes, at best, questionable. A suit to compel delivery
of the list usually proves equally futile since a favorable court order will often come too
late to be of any help. See Hayes & Taussig at 142-43; Rukeyser, supra note 9, at 110.
22 See, e.g., Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.
1967); Moore v. Greatamerica Corp., 274 F. Supp. 490 (N.D. Ohio 1967); United Gas
Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 248 F. Supp. 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd per curiam, 354 F.2d 1002
(2d Cir. 1966).
23 See How To Fend Off A Take-Over, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 83, 162. See also
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. 1 92,532 (2d Cir. Dec.
10, 1969), petition for cert. filed, 38 U.S.L.W. 3489 (June 4, 1970); text accompanying
notes 87-88 infra.2 4 See Fleischer 8- Mundheim at 319, 348 n.119.
25 Unless management owns or controls sufficient shares to make the company
immune, the best preparation against a surprise cash takeover bid is to endeavor
to correct conditions that typically render the company vulnerable to one-poor
operating performance, declining dividends, excessive liquidity.
Schmults 8. Kelly, supra note 19, at 134.
26 Most tender offer suits were prosecuted under SEC rule lOb-5, which prohibits any
person from engaging in "any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security." See notes 83-96 infra and accompanying text.
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were free to utilize tender offers with only a minimum of federal regu-
lation compelling the disclosure of present or future plans. In the ab-
sence of disclosure requirements, the raider operated in almost complete
secrecy.27 The average investor, having to make an important decision
concerning his investment without available information to assist him,
was faced with a dilemma. Analogous situations had prompted the pro-
mulgation of earlier legislation 28 designed to keep the average investor
and the public apprised of the internal operations of corporations.
"Secrecy in this area is inconsistent with the expectations of the people
who invest in the securities of publicly held corporations and impairs
public confidence in securities as a medium of investment. ' 29 Investor
protection mandates that certain information be laid at the investor's
disposal and Congress 0 has now enacted laws to ensure the dissemina-
tion of information necessary for informed decisions.31
The superior effectiveness and increased use of tender offers gen-
erated considerable concern among entrenched and often inefficient
management.32 The federal government, on the other hand, evidenced
27 [T]he law does not even require that he disclose his identity, tile source of his
funds, who his associates are, or what he intends to do if he gains control of
the corporation. . . . [U]nless incumbent management explains its position
publicly, the investor is severely limited in obtaining all of the facts on which
to base a decision whether to accept or reject the tender offer.
H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1968). [hereinafter House Report].
28 E.g., The Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77a
(1964); The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 881 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78a (1964) [hereinafter the 33 Act and the 34 Act respectively].
29 House Report at 3. This report, which accompanied S. 510 as it Was finally enacted
into law, examines other methods of attaining corporate control, e.g., the stock-for-stock ex-
change and the proxy contest and noted that both were adequately covered by existing pro-
visions of the securities laws; it was only the cash tender offer which escaped regulation,
although the same powerful considerations which require disclosure in the former situa-
tions were noticeably present.
80 Congress was also presented with the enactment of similar laws by other countries
which had acted under the pressure of the same problems which were occurring in this
country in connection with cash tender offers. See, e.g., Ontario Securities Act, 14 & 15
Eliz. 2, ch. 142, §§ 86, 95 (1966); Victoria, Australia Act. No. 6839, § 184 (1961); Preven-
tion of Fraud (Investments) Act, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 45, § 14 (1958) (England).
31 The questions which must be answered prior to the exercise of an informed in-
vestor decision in regard to a cash tender offer include:
[D]oes he want to remain with the company under the new and inspiring leader-
ship which is sometimes offered; two, does he think that, in any event, even if
he tenders all of his shares and they are not all taken he is going to continue
as a member of that company... ?
Hearing on H.R. 14475, S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1968) (re-
marks of Mr. Cohen).
32 It should be noted, however, that it has more recently been demonstrated that
tender offers are also made in situations characterized by efficient management. See Com-
ment, supra note 6, at 253. Generally, the stock of the corporations involved is under-
valued vis-A-vis comparable corporations, and raiders, recognizing a profit potential, are
goaded into making an offer for shares. Id. at 254.
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a similar consternation over the intense popularity of the take-over bid
and, in many cases, the fierce battles that generally ensued between
the raiding company and the "target." By 1965, sufficient prodding had
moved Congress to action, and several bills engaging this newest device
for acquiring corporate control were introduced. Incorporating SEC
recommendations prompted by this earlier legislation, and in an effort
to blunt the edge of the raider's position while providing increased dis-
closure, Senator Harrison Williams of New Jersey introduced Senate
Bill 510 during the closing days of 1967. As introduced
[t]he measure [was] not aimed at obstructing legitimate takeover
bids. In some instances, a change in management will prove a
welcome boon for shareholders .... [Rather] [e]very effort [was]
made to avoid tipping the balance of regulatory burden in favor
of management or in favor of the offeror. The purpose of the bill
is to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of stockholders
while at the same time providing the offeror and management
equal opportunity to fairly present their case.33
To this end the Act, while structurally detailed, would seem, as some
have suggested, more of a license to police the area than a compilation
of specific congressional mandates. 34
A. Section 13(d)-Acquisitions of More Than 10 Percent of a Class
of Registered Securities
As enacted, section 13(d)35 deals with the acquisition of more than
10 percent of a class of registered securities. It is applicable to any
person" who acquires beneficial ownership of any equity security regis-
33 113 CoNe. REc. 854-55 (1967).
34 [T]he Act might be viewed as little more than an indication of Congressional
concern over the surprising increase in cash takeover bids, leaving it largely up
to the Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt rules that will provide the
appropriate regulation. In fact, Section 10 of the 1934 Act has always given the
Commission ample authority to regulate this field.
See Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure In Connection With Cash Take-Over Bids: The New
Regulations, 24 Bus. LAw. 19 (1968).
In fact, the day following enactment, the SEC promulgated regulations implement-
ing the law. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8370 (July 30, 1968) (adopting
temporary rules and regulations under §§ 13(d),(e) and 14(d),(f)). These rules and regula-
tions were later amended in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8392 (Aug. 30,
1968). They were finally adopted and are now codified as Regulation 13D, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.18d-1 et seq.; Regulation 14D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 et seq. (1970).
Commentary on the early bills and the provisions as enacted has been prolific. See,
e.g., Brudney, A Note On Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 609 (1967);
Hamilton, Some Reflections On Cash Tender Offer Legislation, 15 N.Y.L.F. 269 (1969);
Note, Cash Tender Offers, 83 HAav. L. RPEv. 377 (1969); Comment, Regulation of Con-
tested Cash Tender Offers, 46 TEXAs L. R.v. 915 (1968); Comment, Senate Bill 510 And
The Cash Tender Offer, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 568 (1968).
35 82 Stat. 454 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
36 For purposes of both section 13(d) and 14(d), "person" is deemed to include "two
or more persons . . . [acting] as a partnership, limited partnership, syndicate, or other
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tered pursuant to section 12 of the 34 Act 37 (or any issue of a closed-end
registered investment company under the Investment Company Act of
1940)88 if after such acquisition he will beneficially own more than 10
percent of the securities of that particular class. 39 Once it is determined
that the section is applicable, the person involved must file a statement
with the issuer of the security, the various exchanges upon which the
issue is traded and the SEC. This filing must occur within 10 days
following the acquisition.40 The section provides certain information
that could be filed and authorizes the Commission to issue supplemen-
tary regulations requiring additional information necessary to effect
the underlying purpose of the provision. The background and the
identity of all persons by whom or on whose behalf the purchases have
been made; the source and amount of funds used in making the pur-
chase; if the purpose behind the purchase is to acquire control, any
plans the acquirer may have to liquidate, sell the assets or merge the
company or any other major change he might have in mind could all
be required information. Furthermore, the SEC could require the
"person" to note the number of shares he beneficially owns and the
number of shares which he has a right to acquire, as well as any con-
group for the purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer. ..."
§ 13(d)(3), 82 Stat. 455 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969). Notice must also
be taken of SEC rule 13d-, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-3 (1970), which provides that a person
shall be deemed the beneficial owner of the securities represented by presently exercisable
options, warrants or rights, or through the conversion of presently convertible securities.
These securities are also regarded as "outstanding for the purpose of computing the
percentage of outstanding securities of the class owned by such person," but not for
computation of the percentage owned by any other person.
87 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (Supp. IV, 1969). This section
provides the general requirements necessary for registration under the 34 Act. Generally
speaking, the 34 Act extends disclosure requirements for investor protection to issuers
who have securities listed and traded over-the-counter and on the national securities ex-
changes. Section 12 requires companies which list and register their securities for public
trading on such an exchange to file a registration application with both the exchange
and the SEC.
3854 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (Supp. IV, 1969). This Act pro-
vides for regulation of the so-called "mutual funds" or open-end management com-
panies. These companies are usually easy to identify because they clearly state that they
are companies whose business is investment. The problem area is in identifying the
closed-end investment company, that is to say a company which purchases shares in
various companies and does not redeem them. A great deal of confusion arises between
this type of company and a company which holds and from time to time buys and sells
securities of other corporations. The Act distinguishes between these in order to alleviate
the confusion. In any event, companies subject to the Act must register with the SEC as
investment companies. Failure to do so results in strict penalization. See generally 1
L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 144-53 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter Loss].
39The underlying purpose of section 13(d) is to "require disclosure of information
by persons who have acquired a substantial interest, or increased their interest in the
equity securities of a company by a substantial amount, within a relatively short period
of time." House Report at 8. The section is addressed to a situation which typically at-
tends the cash take-over bid.
40 House Report at 8.
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tracts, arrangements or understandings regarding the securities. 41 The
Act further provides that any changes which may occur following the
original disclosure shall be revealed by way of an amendment which
is to be forwarded to the issuer of the securities, the exchanges upon
which the securities are listed and to the SEC.42 In arriving at the 10
percent figure, all securities of the particular class which are beneficially
owned are included except those which are held by or for the account
of the issuer or the issuer's subsidiary.43 Finally, section 13(d) provides
exceptions from its coverage.44
B. Section 13(e) -Purchases by an Issuer of Its Own Securities
In the ordinary course of events, a corporation engaged in repur-
chasing its securities is serving a legitimate business purpose; the corpo-
ration may simply wish to have stock available for stock option or
employee purchase plans. However, such a measure may well be a ploy
designed to place stock in friendly hands. The virtues of such a defen-
sive measure are obvious; the more stock known to be in friendly hands,
the less likely a tender offer will be attempted. Moreover, such repur-
4182 Stat. 454 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. IV, 1969). Eight copies of the
statement are required to be filed with the Commission. Rule 13d-l, 17 C..R. § 240.13d-1
(1970). The required form to be filed is the schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101
(1970).
42 82 Stat. 454 (1968). 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(2) (Supp. IV, 1969). Eight copies of the
amendment must be filed with the Commission. Rule 13d-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2 (1970).
43 82 Stat. 455 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(4) (Supp. IV, 1969). A 10 percent beneficial
owner of securities who acquires more securities of the same class from the issuer pursuant
to preemptive subscription rights in an offering made to all the shareholders of the
particular class to which the preemptive rights pertain and does not acquire more than
his pro rata share of the securities offered and reports the acquisition pursuant to
§ 16(a), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1964), is exempt from the
provisions of section 13(d). Rule 13d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-4 (1970).
44 82 Stat. 455 (1968), 15 US.C. § 78m(d)(5) (Supp. IV 1969). Section 13(d) is inap-
plicable to:
(A) any acquisition or offer to acquire securities made or proposed to be made
by means of a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933;
(B1 any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a security which, together with
III other acquisitions by the same person of securities of the same class during
the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum of that class;
(C) any acquisition of an equity security by the issuer of such security;
(D) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security which the Commission
... shall exempt... as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having the
effect of, changing or influencing the control of the issuer or otherwise as not
comprehended within the purposes of this subsection.
The important aspect of section 13(d) will be the determination of control groups
subject to the filing requirements. Ostensibly, the courts will look to the circumstances
of each case and place great weight upon shareholder relationships whether these be
personal or business connections. In the first judicial opinion on this point, Bath Indus.,
Inc. v. Blot, CCH FmD. SEC. L. REP. 92,521 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 3, 1969), aff'd, 92,665
(7th Cir. May 20, 1970) the court discovered a control group where shareholders had planned
to pool their voting interests, to acquire additional stock and to obtain the support and
votes of other large shareholders in order to force the company's president to resign.
Subsequently, a schedule 13D was filed but the court would not dissolve the temporary
injunction until the sufficiency of the filing would be determined.
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chase programs, as well as more sophisticated versions of the selective
distribution of outstanding shares (e.g., employee plans and manage-
ment purchases) tend to inflate stock prices and also remove stock from
shareholders who might otherwise have tendered.
While congressional interest did not focus solely upon market
manipulation, such repurchases, if substantial, will affect the market
price. It is to the remedy of this evil that section 13(e) is directed.
The section declares unlawful any such repurchase which contravenes
SEC rules designed to prevent fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
acts and practices. Furthermore, the Commission has the authority to
promulgate regulations which will provide information concerning a
corporation's repurchase program. In addition to being cast in an anti-
fraud context, with the SEC defining proscribed conduct, the section
contains congressional suggestions of requisite disclosure items. The
issuer could be required to disclose the reasons prompting the repur-
chase program, as well as the source of the funds to be paid for the
securities and the method of purchase. 45
C. Section 14(d) - Tender Offers
The amendments to section 14 are specifically addressed to the
regulation of cash take-over bids, commonly referred to as "tender
45 82 Stat. 455 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (Supp. IV, 1969). The section also defines
a purchase by the issuer to include "a purchase by or for the issuer or any person con-
trolling, controlled by, or under common control with the issuer, or a purchase subject
to control of the issuer or any such person."
Acting upon its rule making authority, the Commission promulgated rule l3e-1,
17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-1 (1970). This rule prevents a corporation from repurchasing its own
shares during a registered tender offer unless the issuer files eight copies of a statement
regarding the proposed purchase with the SEC. The statement must include: 1) the
title and amount of securities to be purchased; the names of the sellers and the market
in which the purchase is to be made; 2) the purpose of the purchase and whether the
securities are going to be retired or held or otherwise disposed of; and, 3) the source
and amount of funds to be used in making the purchase and if any part of the
amount is going to be borrowed.
If there is to be a loan, the transaction and the parties thereto must be described.
The rule also demands that the shareholders of the company have had this informa-
tion revealed to them within the preceding six months. See National Union Elec. Corp. v.
National Presto Indus., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP'. 92,460 (W.D. Wis. July 8, 1969)
(court refused to enjoin "target's" repurchase program because of drastic quality of the
relief and insufficient proof of deceptive practices to artificially inflate the market
price).
The Presto case illustrates that courts, in the absence of actual fraud or manipula-
tion, may tend toward leniency in "target" repurchases. Curiously, where the raider is
utilizing an exchange offer, as in 'Presto, section 13(e) may be inapposite as the entire
tenor of the Williams Act sounds in the area of cash tender offers. However, it will be
a rare occasion wherein the "target" will be attempting to defeat the exchange offer since
the success of the device depends upon cooperation between the two companies. Or-
dinarily, the raider in the exchange situation will not proceed absent the allegiance
of incumbent management. See note 119 infra.
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offers." Section 14(d) requires any person who makes a tender offer
for any class of securities registered under section 12 of the 84 Act
(or any equity security issued by a registered closed-end investment
company) to file a statement with the SEC and the issuer, if after the
consummation of the offer the offeror would be a beneficial owner of
more than 10 percent of the particular class of security. The required
filing is to be accomplished prior to or contemporaneous with the an-
nouncement of the tender offer. Once again, the SEC is granted rule
making authority in connection with the information that must be
disclosed. The section specifically requires that all requests and invita-
tions to tender shares, whether by newspaper advertisement or other-
wise, be filed. This mandate applies with equal force to subsequent
offers which must be filed as they are published. The offeror must send
the material to the issuer as well.46 On the other hand, any recommenda-
tions which are made concerning the acceptance or rejection of a tender
offer must be made in accordance with SEC rules and regulations. 47
4682 Stat. 456 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (Supp. IV, 1969). The applicable form to
be filed is schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1970). Additionally, all material changes
which may occur in the original statement must be amended by means of filing the
appropriate information with the Commission and the issuer. The tender offer itself must
contain the name of the offeror; the exact dates prior to which and after which the
depositing shareholders may withdraw their shares pursuant to section 14(a)(5) or other-
wise (see note 49 infra and accompanying text). When the offer is for less than all the
outstanding shares of a class and the offeror need not purchase every share tendered,
the offer must also contain the date upon which the pro rata acceptance period expires.
(The pro rata period is governed by section 14(d)(6), see note 50 infra and accompanying
text.) Subsequent amendments to the original schedule may omit material already fur-
nished. The SEC requires eight copies of every filing. Rule 14d-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l
(1970).
The definition of "person" for purposes of section 14(d) is the same as that provided
in section 13(d), see note 36 supra. Similarly, the method used for computing the per-
centage of securities held is identical to that utilized for purposes of section 13(d), see
text accompanying note 43 supra.
Pursuant to its rule making authority, the SEC has exempted certain communica-
tions from the coverage of the rules and regulations which it has promulgated under
section 14(d). These communications include certain brokers' offers to purchase securities
in connection with a distribution; calls and redemptions of securities; offers to purchase
which are evidenced by script certificates or order forms representing a fractional interest
in a security; offers to purchase dissenting shareholders' securities when pursuant to
statutory procedure; advisors who are not participating in the tender offer may furnish
their customers advice concerning it if the request is unsolicited or pursuant to a
general contract for advice; the issuer may contact its shareholders and report that a
tender offer has been made, that the management is studying the matter and will
forthwith advise the shareholders of their recommendation; the issuer may also request
that the shareholders defer any action until the recommendation is made (this recom-
mendation must be made no later than 10 days prior to the last day upon which tenders
will be accepted by the offeror); finally, offers to purchase securities in transactions ex-
empted by the 33 Act from registration under section 3(a)(10), 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as
amended, 15 US.C. § 77c(a)(10) (1964) are exempted communications for purposes of
section 14(d). Rule 14d-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2 (1970).
4782 Stat. 457 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (Supp. IV 1969). The Commission has
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This subsection devotes itself to eliminating the secrecy attendant
upon a cash tender offer. Under the law as presently structured, a
raiding company must file the 13D schedule when he announces his
offer. The form becomes available to the shareholder who will thus be
better equipped to make a decision concerning the disposition of his
shares. Pursuant to the congressional policy of "strict neutrality," the
management of the "target" company is required to file the 14D sche-
dule before recommendations concerning the tender offer can be
made.48
A more direct form of investor protection provided by section 14(d)
permits the tendering shareholder to withdraw his shares at any time
within seven days after the tender offer is first published and at any
time after 60 days has elapsed. 49 If the tender offer is for less than all
the outstanding shares of a class and more than the requested amount
is tendered within 10 days of the offer's publication, (assuming that
the offeror is unwilling to accept all that are tendered) the shares must
be taken up pro rata according to the number of shares deposited by
each shareholder. 0 In this manner, the offer is kept open for at least
10 days. Should the offeror decide to increase the consideration for
tendered shares, the 10 day period begins to run from the time of the
announcement. In the event that the terms of the tender offer are
changed during the life of the offer, e.g., the consideration is increased,
the extra amount must be paid to every tendering shareholder even if
the shares were tendered before the increase was announced. 51 Finally,
the section provides exemptions from its coverage. 52
designed schedule 14D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1970) which must be filed with the SEC
before any recommendation or solicitation is made in regard to a tender offer. The
schedule was created for the use of incumbent management when they wish to make
recommendations during a tender offer. The raider or any other person besides the
issuer does not have to file a schedule 14D when they make a recommendation if a
schedule 13D has been filed by them pursuant to rule 14d-1. However, these recommen-
dations can be no more extensive than the information provided in the 13D filing.
When a schedule 14D is filed, it must be kept current by means of filing amendments
when material changes occur. Rule 14d-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1970).
45 However, an aperture in the coverage similar to that in section 13(e) is present
in regard to stock-for-stock exchanges. By virtue of section 14(d)(8), (see note 52 infra
and accompanying text), tenders of securities pursuant to a 33 Act registration statement
are exempt.
... the exemption for registered offerings would mean that, although the offeror
would be limited in his solicitations by the disclosure requirements of the Secu-
rities Act, solicitations in opposition would be unregulated except to the extent
that the general antifraud provisions of the securities laws might apply.
Hearing, supra note 31, at 18 (remarks of Mr. Cohen).
49 82 Stat. 457 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (Supp. IV 1969).
5o Id. § 78n(d)(6).
51ld. § 78n(d)(7).
52 Id. § 78n(d)(8). Section 14(d) is inapplicable to any offer for or request for tenders
of any security:
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D. Section 14(e) -Fraudulent Transactions; Section 14(f) - Changes
in Boards of Directors
In order to ensure the full disclosure of material information, the
Williams Act provides a general anti-fraud provision - section 14(e) -
which makes it unlawful "to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer
or request or invitation for tenders." 53 Most importantly, acceding to
the aforementioned congressional policy of "strict neutrality," the sec-
tion contemplates and proscribes with equal force and effect such
chicanery in solicitations both for and against a tender offer. The pro-
vision affirms the concept that raiders, defensive "targets" and anyone
who seeks to influence an investor's decision must "make full disclosure
of material information to those with whom they deal."5
Equally important to investor protection and the prevention of
fraud is section 14(f) which directs itself to the wholesale disposal of
directorate control resulting from arrangements between the raider and
the "target's" management. That section provides 5 that where directors
are to be elected absent a vote of the shareholders, pursuant to an
arrangement between the incumbents and the acquiring parties, in a
transaction subject to section 13(d) or 14(d), and these directors in turn
will encompass a majority of the board, the issuer must file with the
SEC and all shareholders the information ordinarily required 6 when
directors are elected at a shareholders meeting.
A PERIOD OF REFLECTION
Inasmuch as a schedule 13D 57 need not be filed prior to the an-
nouncement of a tender offer, the raider's ability to act in secrecy
(A) proposed to be made by means of a registration statement under the Secu-
rities Act of 1933;
(B) if the acquisition of such security, together with all other acquisitions by the
same person of securities of the same class during the preceding twelve months,
would not exceed 2 per centum of that class;
(C) by the issuer of such security; or
(D) which the Commission . .. shall exempt....
53 82 Stat. 457 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (Supp. IV 1969).
54 House Report at 11.
55 82 Stat. 457 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(f (Supp. IV 1969).
G6 § 14(a),(c), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a),(c) (1964). These are
the proxy solicitation sections which require that prior to any request for a proxy (or if
no proxy is solicited prior to the corporation's annual meeting) certain information
must be sent both to the shareholders and the SEC. Accordingly, the SEC requires that
certain items of schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (1970), be filed when arrangements
regarding the selection of directors occur in connection with the acquisition of securities
covered by section 14(d). The information must be filed not later than 10 days prior
to the date upon which the office is to be assumed. Rule 14-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14f-1
(1970).
57Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (1970). The schedule may be prefiled if the
acquiring company so desires and this may be ultimately beneficial to the raider because
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remains relatively untarnished. During the interim, the raider is free
to pick up stock on the open market provided its beneficial ownership
remains below the 10 percent level.58 Admittedly, the forced compli-
ance with a statute which requires the preparation of a disclosure
document, makes it more difficult to maintain secrecy. However, a
raider who is capable of planning a successful take-over should be equally
adept at maintaining secrecy, even in the preparation of required dis-
closures. If the preparation period is lengthened, the additional time
may be used to acquire up to 9V percent 9 of the "target's" stock at a
more favorable price.60
The Act was not intended to improve the offeror's position61 and
it will provide an SEC opinion as to the sufficiency of the filing before the total com-
mitment is made. The information required to be filed includes: the class of securities
sought and the name and address of the issuer; the identity and background of the
offeror; the source and amount of funds to be used in the purchase; if control is
sought, any plans or 'proposals for subsequent liquidation, asset sales or merger or any
major structural changes; the number of beneficially owned shares the offeror already
has; any options the offeror has to acquire such securities; and a list of the offeror's
representatives empowered to make solicitations or recommendations to the "target's"
shareholders.
68 Professor Mundheim has noted that this situation arises as a result of the defini-
tional problem in the legislation, i.e., the term "tender offer" is not defined. In a very
real sense, the offer can be considered to commence when the acquirer starts picking up
shares on the open market. See Mundheim, Tender Offers, 2 Rv. SEc. R.G. 953, 955
(1969). See also 6 Loss 3669. Commenting upon the definitional problem in the
Act, Professor Loss wonders whether an offer to buy a controlling block from a limited
group would be exempt. Rule 14d-2, relating to exempted communications, was explained
by the SEC as follows: "The exclusions relate to matters such as offers to no more than
ten security holders during any period of twelve months." SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 8392 (Aug. 30, 1968). Yet, the exclusion was not embodied in the rule.
59 It is wise to keep the acquired number of shares below 10 percent for another
reason. In the event of an aborted take-over bid, the corporation will be able to sell
these shares without coming into conflict with section 16(b) of the 34 Act, the so-called
"short-swing" provision. The effect of this section is that any profits an officer, director
or 10 percent shareholder receives through transactions in the company's stock within a
six month period from the time of acquisition must be returned to the company's
treasury. Section 16 is an area of complexity and its provisions are meant to be con-
sidered completely apart from the provisions of section 13(d). See generally 2 Loss 1040-
87. See also Lowenfels, Section 16(b): A New Trend In Regulating Insider Trading, 54
Coma=au L. REv. 45 (1968); Note, Extension of Liability Under Section 16(b)-A Whole
New Can of Worms, 11 Aniz. L. Rav. 309 (1969); Note, Stock Exchanges Pursuant to
Corporate Consolidation: A Section 16(b) "Purchase Or Sale"?, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 1034
(1969).
60 Whether the safe limit of 92 percent will remain viable in light of Senator Wil-
Hams' renewed efforts to provide investor protection in the area of tender offers is
doubtful. Recently, he has introduced a bill which would reduce the disclosure require-
ment level from 10 percent to 5 percent. The bill also endeavors to extend disclosure
requirements to take-over efforts involving "target" insurance companies. See S. 3431, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); 116 CONG. REc. 1533-34 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1970). See also N.Y.
Ti ais, Mar. 26, 1970, at 71, col. 3.
61 This congressional intention remains axiomatic, although some have and un-
doubtedly will continue to adhere to a position which condemns the legislative "neu-
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although it appears that the new regulation does not greatly affect the
raider's plans, the original problems attending a cash tender offer re-
main. When the required disclosure is additionally considered, the
virtues of the method are significantly mitigated.
By maintaining secrecy, the offeror will be greatly limited in his
investigation of the "target. '6 2 When the offer is publicly announced
the market price will tend to seek the level of the offer. Consequently,
the cost of the venture will increase if success is to be attained. As a
result of the Williams Amendments, the offeror must also allow a
tendering shareholder to withdraw his shares anytime within the week
following the offer and anytime after 60 days, if by that time the
offeror fails to accept the tendered shares. This provision, temporarily at
least, does lend an element of instability to the offeror's plans. After
that time, the major concern is the pro rata requirement, should the
offeror decide not to accept all the shares tendered.63
trality" policy in favor of "laissez-faire." Prior to enactment, Professor Manne made the
following observation:
. . . public investors should not be on an equal footing with individuals who
have created new information and are performing a function which necessarily
benefits everyone. If we put the completely passive shareholder on the same
footing as this individual, the latter will have little incentive to take over con-
trol of a poorly run company and thereby protect noncontrolling shareholders
from bad management.
Manne, supra note 6, at 241.
See also Comment, supra note 6 which contains a compilation of data concerning
cash tender offers leading the author to conclude that regulation is unwarranted both
for the reason that tender offers rarely succeed without the support of incumbent man-
agement and that even unsuccessful tender offers inure to the shareholders' benefit by
driving up the stock price.
62 An attractive "target" may be easily identified by its low earnings, low dividends,
cash accumulations and unhappy shareholders but this identification in no way takes
the place of a thorough investigation of the company's legal background and corporate
history. The timing of the tender offer necessarily suffers when the offeror is unfamiliar
with the internal climate of the "target." This is to say that incumbent management
may be on the verge of announcing new corporate developments or dividend decisions
which may ultimately scourge the effectiveness of the tender offer. Furthermore, this
ignorance of the "target" company may well lead the offeror into offering an unsubstan-
tial premium for tendered shares. Consequently, the offer will fail due to opposition from
management, shareholders and even alien companies that have engendered interest in
the "target" as a result of this tender offer. See Swanson, S. 510 And The Regulation Of
Cash Tender Offers: Distinguishing St. George From The Dragon, 5 HAgv. J. oN Lac.
431, 434 & n.12, 439-40 (1968) [hereinafter Swanson].
63 Financing the cash tender offer may cause the offeror additional consternation if
the margin requirements of regulations G, T or U are violated. 12 C..R. §§ 207, 220,
221 (1970). Prior to the Williams Amendments, such violations were difficult to discern
because of the inaccessibility of information as to the financier of the offeror's bid. With
this information required to be furnished not only will the "target" company be able
to allege possible margin violations but the Federal Reserve Board will be able to give
these matters closer scrutiny. In the alternative, the "target" has an excellent defensive
technique by accosting the lender with the possible violation in the hope that he will
withdraw his financial support. See SEC v. Madison Square Garden Corp., CCH FED.
Sac. L. REP. 92,493 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 1969) (complaint filed); 92,649 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29,
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In order to implement the congressional intent of avoiding favor-
itism toward either side, the SEC has created the compulsory filing of
schedule 14D64 when the "target" makes recommendations concerning
the tender offer. This provision, however, constructs an uninvited delay
into a scheme, the very existence of which depends upon speed. While
there is nothing in the legislation which requires management to com-
municate with its shareholders and thereby be forced to file with the
Commission, such a course of action is not recommended since it gives
the raider an easy conquest. Consequently, incumbent management
must eliminate the element of surprise in the raider's plan.6 5 This
necessity demands that a company continually prepare for a possible
attack; a battle plan must be prepared. 66 The corporation's charter or
by-laws should be amended with a view toward making control more
difficult to attain. 7 Additionally, the corporation should keep the
1970) (consent decree entered). See also Kennedy, Tender Moment, 23 Bus. LAw. 1091,
1103 (1968) [hereinafter Kennedy]; Note, Application Of Margin Requirements To The
Cash Tender Offer, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 103 (1967).
Ostensibly, the problem may be circumvented if the offeror procures his financing
through foreign lending institutions, which are not within the purview of the aforesaid
regulations. Accord, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., CCH FE. SEC.
L. REP. J 92,471 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1969).
64 Schedule 141), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-101 (1970). The information required by this
schedule includes: the identification of both the security sought and the offeror; the
reasons for the recommendation to accept or reject the offer; the identity of the filer of
this statement plus any agreements that may exist between him and the issuer or the
offeror; and a list of the persons employed by the filer to make solicitations or recom-
mendations to shareholders. Copies of such solicitations must also be filed.
65 See Sauerhaft, And Now- A Raid on the Raiders?, DUN's REv., May 1969, at 56.
66 This plan should include early warning procedures which will put the "target" on
notice before the actual offer is made. Shareholder lists should be analyzed to see where
large holdings are located. Letters to shareholders should be prepared advising them
to make no decision prior to management's recommendation (an exempt communication
under rule 14d-2). At the same time, management should be preparing its recommenda-
tions and possible courses of action. See generally Defensive Tactics.
67 Amending these instruments must be done in accordance with the applicable
state law procedures. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAw § 704 (McKinney 1963) (classifying the board of directors, providing a staggered
election system making control more difficult to achieve); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214
(1967); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 618 (McKinney 1963) (cumulative voting); DL... CODE ANN.
fit. 8, § 216 (1967); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 616 (McKinney 1963) (require extraordinary
requirements for shareholder action particularly in regard to approving a merger and
amending the by-laws or charter). When utilizing defensive tactics which involve amend-
ing charters to change voting rights, it is essential to consider stock exchange policies.
E.g., NEw YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANuAL, at A-280-A-282 (1969) (the exchange
will not list a nonvoting stock which is, in effect, a common stock or preferred stock,
or stocks with unusual voting privileges). But see New York Stock Exchange Press Re-
lease, Feb. 12, 1970 wherein the Exchange expresses approval of the listing of long-term
stock warrants for trading.
It is also feasible to have inserted in all outstanding loan agreements a triggering
device which will accelerate maturation of the indebtedness in the event of a merger.
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information required for a schedule 14D filing readily available. When
a raid materializes, a great deal of time will be saved and management's
recommendations will almost immediately be in the hands of the
shareholders.
Significantly, one of the incumbent's most potent weapons has been
affected, i.e., the repurchase of the company's own shares. Broadly
speaking, this tactic has a double-barreled effect insofar as it reduces
the amount of shares available for tendering and concomitantly in-
creases the market price of the target's stock: (1) it impedes the offeror's
attempt to gain control, and (2) it inhibits the shareholders incentive
to tender. However, it is now impossible for the issuer to repurchase
its shares during a cash tender offer unless the information required by
rule 13e-1 is filed both with the SEC and the shareholders. 8
From the investor's viewpoint, the situation has proceeded to a
point where information is made available to him; whether he has the
ability of comprehending it is another problem.
PRACTICAL PROBLEMS: FRAUD AND MANIPULATION
Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp.
The heart of any securities regulation is necessarily that portion
which allows redress of grievances. Section 10(b) 69 and the ubiquitous
rule lOb-57 0 promulgated thereunder have historically been the watch-
dogs in the purchase and sale of securities, keeping both the transactors
and the transactions honest. Although theoretically the SEC had the
power under section 10(b) to regulate cash tender offers, it never
brought them within the ambit of regulation 7 ' The Commission
waited for the congressional authority which finally came in the form
of section 14(e).
See A. CHOKA, BUYING, SELLING, AND MERGING BusIEssEs 3 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter
A. CHOKA].
Defensive mergers are still available as a thwarting device against an unwanted
take-over. In their preparations, incumbent managements are well advised to keep their
eyes open for possible candidates for this purpose. The problem in this area is the
necessity of stockholder approval for such action in many states and under stock ex-
change rules. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. Corn,. LAW § 910 (McKinney 1963); NEw YORK STOcK
EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL, at A-284. See also Sauerhaft, supra note 65; Abele, supra
note 17.(8 See National Union Elec. Corp. v. National Presto Indus., Inc., CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 92,460 (W.D. Wis. July 8, 1969). See also note 45 supra.
00 48 Stat. 891 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964).
70 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
71 See Note, The Regulation of Corporate Tender Offers Under Federal Securities
Law: A New Challenge for Rule 10b-5, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 359 (1966).
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Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 2 is the
first appellate consideration of the 1968 Amendments. Defendant, In-
ternational Controls Corporation (ICC), a manufacturer of valves,
controls, computer and aircraft parts had initiated unproductive merger
negotiations with plaintiff, Electronic Specialty Company (ELS), a
manufacturer of electronic and aerospace components and systems, as
part of the former's acquisition program. When these preliminary dis-
cussions aborted, ELS announced that it had agreed instead to merge
with a third corporation, Carpenter Steel Company. ICC, on being
apprised of the pending merger, orally agreed with ELS that the latter
would repurchase at $42 per share up to 50,000 shares of its own stock
that ICC had acquired on the open market prior to their merger
negotiations. Advised that the agreement was unenforcible, ICC went
to the market in an effort to dispose of the stock and managed to sell
a small percentage.
Unfortunately for ELS, the market reaction to its proposed merger
was unfavorable and its stock price plummeted. ICC sought the oppor-
tunity to renew its tender offer and the shareholder reaction to the
offer was overwhelming -"considerably . . . [greater] than ICC ex-
pected or wished."7 3
Shortly after the announcement of the tender offer, ELS filed suit
in the Southern District of New York, under section 14(e) and rule
lOb-5, in an effort to compel ICC to divest itself of ELS stock and to
restrain the voting of the same, alleging that ICC, by its president,
Robert Vesco, had misled shareholders by material misrepresentations74
and omissions in the written tender offer,7 5 and, by manipulative de-
vices, had calculated to depress the price of ELS's shares. 6 Included
72 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
73 Id. at 944.
74 The misstatements in question appeared in the Wall Street Journal and on the
Dow Jones Broad Tape; ELS alleged that ICC was responsible to correct this misleading
material. The press release was apparently the result of an interview between Vesco and
a columnist. In any event, Vesco denied making the published comment. Id. at 950 &
n.1l. The Dow Jones statement in issue came over the tape at the time the ICC negotia-
tions had broken down and ELS had begun merger discussions with Carpenter. It related
that no tender offer was contemplated presently. Id. at 950 & n.9.
75 The tender offer was considered misleading by ELS because of its niggardly ex-
pression of ICC's subsequent plans for the "target"; the offer had merely recited that
ICC would give consideration to a merger with ELS. On the basis of the concern over
the adequacy of this portion of the offer, ICC amended its tender offer to include that
the merger consideration would be on the basis of relative market prices during a repre-
sentative period.
76 It was alleged that in this manner ICC made its tender offer price more attractive.
409 F.2d at 943.
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among the plaintiffs was the corporation itself; one Burgess, a large
nontendering shareholder of ELS, purporting to represent all such
shareholders; and one Fitzsimmons, a tendering shareholder, purport-
ing to represent all such shareholders. At trial, the relief sought was
denied in both instances, the denial of the preliminary injunction being
conditioned upon trial at the October term.77 Upon trial of the latter
issue, the tendering shareholder's cause of action was summarily dis-
missed because ICC (following the "unexpected" success of its offer)
had amended the offer to permit tendering shareholders the option of
withdrawing their shares. As to the nontendering shareholders and the
corporation, standing was recognized. The court refused to divest and
restrain ICC from voting the acquired shares but believed that Vesco's
statements had misled ELS and the public as to ICC's intention to make
a tender offer, as to its intention to sell or not sell the ELS shares orig-
inally acquired and as to the number of shares it had acquired on the
open market, all in violation of rule lOb-5 and section 14(e). Conse-
quently, ICC was enjoined from further violating the 34 Act.78
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed
with the district court's determination that both nontendering share-
holders and the "target" corporation have standing to sue under section
14(e), a commodity not clearly available to lOb-5 suitors. The court did
not, however, limit itself to the facts presented; rather it found "the
issues raised about the standing of the target corporation and non-
tendering stockholders [to be of] such general importance in the en-
forcement of § 14(d) and (e) as to make an expression of our views
desirable." 79 Having divested itself of the factual limitations, the court
concluding that the interests of the "target" and nontenderers were
"sufficiently independent to give standing to both under all the provi-
sions added to § 14,"80 affirmed the lowei' court's recognition of stand-
ing. However, considering the alleged misstatements, the court found
that the statement following the announcement of the tender offer
concerning a possible merger was sufficiently accurate and did not re-
quire elaboration. Indeed, as the court carefully noted, it is often just
as serious to "overstate the definiteness of the plans as to understate
them."81 Since the Vesco announcement was skeletal, the court, by
diluting the express requirement that the raider disclose "any plans
77 296 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
78 295 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
79 409 F.2d at 945.
8o Id. at 946.
sl Id. at 948.
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or proposals [he] may have,"8' 2 at least impliedly, approved broader
statements as to a raider's subsequent plans. As to the final allegations,
ICC was under no duty to correct unattributable misstatements, while
the report over the broad tape was found to be accurate at the time it
was released. Consequently, the complaint against ICC was dismissed.
The Effect of Section 14(e) and Electronic: A Burial Plot for Rule 10b-5
Prior to the passage of the Williams Act, most tender offer suits
were prosecuted under the broad anti-fraud provisions of rule lOb-5;
identified as a proper vehicle for the vindication of shareholders'
rights,83 but judicially limited to actions by "purchasers or sellers."8 4
Insofar as both "targets" and nontenderers have generally been denied
this status, 1Ob-5 has remained beyond their grasp.
While the passage of section 14(e) evinces a deep congressional
concern over the plight of nontenderers and "target" companies, ques-
tions involving the viability of 1 Ob-5 as a regulatory device are presently
before the courts. In Iroquois Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.,85
the Second Circuit, reasoning that the 1968 Amendments evidenced
that both the offeror and "target" corporations lacked standing to sue
under rule lOb-5, refused to abandon the "purchaser/seller" doctrine
enunciated in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,8s and upheld the dis-
missal of a lOb-5 claim brought by an offeror.
A more recent contribution to the portrait of lOb-5's role in the
regulation of cash tender offers is Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake
Co.8 7 Seeking to frustrate Crane's take-over bid, Air Brake sought to
effect a defensive merger with American Standard Company. Pursuant
to a complex trading scheme, Air Brake in concert with American Stan-
dard, effectively manipulated the market price of the former's shares,
thereby thwarting Crane's overtures. Significantly, upon the subsequent
consummation of the proposed merger between Air Brake and Amer-
ican Standard, Crane being a direct competitor of Standard, was forced
(because of a threatened antitrust action) to divest itself of the shares
82 Rule 14d-1, 17 CY.R. § 240.14d-1 (1970); Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101
(1970).
83 See generally Lockwood, Corporate Acquisitions And Actions Under Sections 10(b)
and 14 Of The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 23 Bus. LAw 365 (1968).
84 Under rule lOb-5, a plaintiff must be a purchaser or a seller in order to get relief.
See, e.g., Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952). Compare Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 970 (1967); Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
85 CCH FED. SEC. L. RElP. 92,526 (2d Cir. Nov. 3, 1969), petition for cert. filed,
38 U.S.L.W. 3454 (May 7, 1970).
86 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952).
87 CCH FEn. SEc. L. RtP. 92,532 (2d Cir. Dec. 10, 1969).
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it had picked up on the open market. Shortly thereafter, Crane com-
menced an action alleging, among other things, violation of rule lOb-5.
Concluding that Crane was a "forced seller" under Birnbaum, the
Second Circuit held Air Brake's failure to disclose the manipulative
trading scheme a material omission, thus actionable under lob-5.
While Iroquois and Crane reflect a clear judicial refusal to abandon
the stringencies of Birnbaum,s8 conjecture as to the ultimate resolution
of the issue, in view of the enactment of section 14(e), would seem
merely academic. Clearly, the latter provision will provide the proper
standard for redress.
Beyond providing an explicit formulation of the requisite capacity
to sue under sections 14(d) and (e), Electronic affirms an earlier test of
materiality: whether any shareholders who tendered their shares would
probably not have done so had the alleged violation not occurred 8 9
Clearly, such a test is more stringent than that presented by the court
in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.90 as determinative of materiality in
a lOb-5 situation. That test defined information "which may affect the
desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities" 91 as
material. However, in other respects section 14(e) is not as stringent as
rule lOb-5. For instance, as Electronic establishes, a plaintiff need not
be a purchaser or a seller 92 in order to seek redress under 14(e); 93 nor
is it necessary that he be an "insider" for the duty of disclosure to at-
tach.94 Nevertheless, the plaintiff must establish that irreparable damage
88 Cf. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 874 F.2d 627 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970
(1967) (favoring what has been termed a "broad construction of 'purchase' and 'sale',"
see Note, supra note 84, at 380 n.21).
89 See Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840, 843 (2d Cir.
1967). See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
1 92,470, at 98,224 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 1969).
90 401 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
91 Id. at 849.
92 See note 84 supra.
93See 6 Loss 8620; Kennedy at 1113-14. A shareholder who accepts a tender offer
naturally has standing under rule lOb-5. But a non-tenderer or the "target" company
generally will not qualify as a purchaser or a seller. But see Neuman v. Electronic
Specialty Co., CCH F . SEc. L. REt. 1 92,591 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 31, 1969).
An important element in the reasoning on the standing issue in Electronic may be
traced to the court's penchant to effectuate the legislative intention behind the Williams
Act, i.e., adequate disclosure for the public investor. The court saw its quest to be en-
forcement of that which "will best accomplish the purposes of the legislature." 409 F.2d
at 946. To this end, standing was recognized for both non-tenderers and the "target."
Similarly, in finding that ICC had not violated the securities law, the court looked to
the congressional intendment and found the primary motivation to be the embellishment
of "basic honesty and fair dealing [rather than the imposition of] an unrealistic require-
ment of laboratory conditions that might make the new statute a potent tool for incum-
bent management to protect its own interests against the desires and welfare of the
stockholders." Id. at 948.
94See Fleischer S. Mundheim at 331-32; Swanson at 460. The greatest problem in
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will result should the relief requested be denied,95 and that he is rea-
sonably certain of success in an action on the merits.9
Other Arenas of Fraud Collateral to the Cash Tender Offer: Short
Tendering and larket Purchases During the Life of an Offer.
In order to further reduce the possibility of fraud in connection
with tender offers, the Commission has adopted two rules under section
10(b). Rule lOb-4 97 is addressed to the practice known as short tender-
ing and rule lOb-13s8 is designed to prohibit a tender offeror from pur-
chasing on the open market while his offer is in effect.
A tender offer may not require that the stock certificates be depos-
ited if a bank or member firm of an exchange guarantees their delivery
on demand or at a specific time. This policy has led to a greater appre-
ciation of short tendering. For example, if pursuant to a tender offer,
shares were to be accepted pro rata and a clever broker estimated that
only half of his shares would be accepted, he would tender twice as
many shares as he owned. Without having to deposit them, he was
assured of disposing all the shares he actually owned. In an effort de-
signed to eliminate this practice, the Commission adopted rule 1Ob-4
which makes it a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance for
any person to tender for his own account any security he does not
own, or to tender or guarantee the tender of another unless the security
is in the tenderer's possession or the guarantor has reason to believe
that the person owns the security and will deliver it.19
getting corporate raiders involved in cash tender offers under lOb-5 is affixing, a duty
to disclose their impending plans. In most cases, when the plan is formulated, the
raider has no connection whatsoever with the "target." Consequently, no "insider" re-
sponsibility to disclose its plans to the "target's" shareholders is present. See, e.g., Mills v.
Sarjem Corp., 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ. 1955).
95 See Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., CCH FED. SEC.
L. R'. 92,557 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 1970), afl'g 92,543 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24, 1969); Symington
Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967); Walston & Co. v.
Haven Indus., Inc., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,364 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 5, 1969); Armour & Co. v. General Host Corp., 296 F. Supp. 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
98The limits of federal regulation would further suggest that the plaintiff allege
and prove either use of the mails or interstate facilities in the tender offer, or registration
of the "target" company under the 33 or the 34 Act.
§ 14(e), alone of all the SEC fraud provisions that are not grounded on a regis-
tration requirement that is itself conditioned on some use of the mails or
interstate commerce . . . is completely silent with respect to these assumed pre-
requisites to federal jurisdiction.
6 Loss 3661.
97 17 C-F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1970).
98 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1970). This rule was recently adopted in SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8712 (Oct. 8, 1969).
99See Hearing, supra note 31, at 14 (statement of Mr. Cohen). See also 6 Loss
8662-63.
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In most cases, a tender offeror is interested in obtaining control of
the "target"; and this goal is usually accomplished by acquiring a ma-
jority of the outstanding shares. Frequently, a majority interest may be
obtained from those few shareholders who own a controlling block of
securities. When a tender offer is announced, controlling shareholders
realize their superior bargaining position and may sell only at a higher
consideration than that specified in the offer. This state of affairs often
leads to private bartering between the offeror and the controllers, the
results of which often deliver a profit to the large shareholder at the ex-
pense of the minority shareholder who does not command the leverage
necessary to manipulate the offeror. Cognizant of such abuses, the Com-
mission promulgated rule lOb-13 which prohibits the offeror from pur-
chasing equity securities of the same class to which his offer pertains
during the period of the tender offer in any manner other than pursuant
to the terms of the tender offer. In this form, the rule protects the interests
of shareholders who have already tendered their shares and prevents the
large shareholders from exploiting the power incidental to their con-
trolling positions. The rule covers the period from the time the offer
is announced until the time the offeror must either accept or reject the
tendered shares. The Commission feels that the pre-tender period is ade-
quately covered by rule lob-5 and is therefore not included within the
coverage of lOb-13. The rule is applicable to cash and stock tender of-
fers alike but does not apply to purchases by the issuer or employees
pursuant to stock option or purchase plans. 100
100 It should be noted that sly controllers who make an agreement with the offeror
during the tender offer period to purchase their shares after the offer has elapsed are
within the ambit of rule lOb-13. The original SEC proposal in this area required the
offeror who purchased outside the realm of his offer to take up all tendered shares at
the highest consideration given for any security of the class sought. See SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8391 (Aug. 30, 1968). Apparently, a substantial amount of
criticism concerning the original proposal was delivered to the SEC causing the rule
to be amended to its present form. The main objection to the original proposal is that
a "forced" sale goes far beyond the simple disclosure philosophy upon which our
securities laws are based. See Schmults & Kelly, supra note 34, at 26-27.
For other reasons, the promulgation of lOb-13 has not ended the criticism launched
upon it by some members of the securities bar. See generally Lowenfels, Rule lob-13,
Rule lOb-6 And Purchases Of Target Company Securities During An Exchange Offer,
69 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1392 (1969) wherein the author takes umbrage at the passage of the
rule without observation of the traditional requirement that comment and criticism be
accepted from the public prior to promulgation. Mr. Lowenfels' forcible argument
takes issue with the SEC position that rule lOb-13 is but a "codification of existing
interpretations under Rule l0b-6." See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8595
(May 5, 1969).
Few members of the securities bar were ever aware of the staff's position and
fewer members understood it. No in-depth rational analysis has ever been pre-
sented to justify this position.
Lowenfels, supra, at 1409.
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The penalties ultimately levied upon a violator of the anti-fraud
provisions in a cash tender offer are not punitive,101 and where the vio-
lation is due to mistake'02 rather than chicanery, the penalty imposed
may amount to an official chastisement and an order to desist from such
conduct in the future. 03 Furthermore, a violator may effectively dimin-
ish prolonged litigation by merely consenting to the entry of an injunc-
tion without admitting the substantive violations. Of course, both the
plaintiff (usually the SEC) and the court must also agree to such action,
but when permitted this procedure amounts to a promise to avoid fu-
ture possible violations of the anti-fraud provisions.10 4
101 In fact, punitive damages are not recoverable under either the 33 or the 34 Act.
See, e.g., Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,474 (2d Cir.
Sept. 9, 1969), cert. denied, 38 U.S.L.W. 3316 (Feb. 24, 1970); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969).
102 However, one mistake which may prove very costly to an offeror occurs when he
has become an investment company within the contemplation of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, i.e., if 40 percent of the company's assets is comprised of securities in
another company, it has become an investment company. § 3(a)(3), 54 Stat. 797 (1940),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1969).
The Act does provide exemptions in which an acquiring company must fall in order
to avoid the stigma of being an investment company. The "target" must become a
wholly owned subsidiary of the raider (but not engaging in the investment business) -an
automatic exemption; or if the "target" is only controlled by means of a majority of
the shares (and it is not an investment company) an exemption may be obtained from
the SEC. § 3(b), 54 Stat. 797 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(1),(2) (Supp. IV,
1969).
If the acquirer has to wait for an SEC exemption order, it may technically be
operating as an unregistered investment company. The penalties for the unregistered
operation of an investment company include the prohibition from selling any securities
and from engaging in any business which involves interstate commerce. § 7(a), 54 Stat.
802 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-7(a) (1964). Furthermore, any contracts the company makes
are totally void. § 46(b), 54 Stat. 845 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-46(b) (1964). See generally
Kerr, The Inadvertent Investment Company: Section 3(a)(3) of the Investment Company
Act, 12 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1959). See also SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp.
3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
103 Cf. In re Susquehanna Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. RaP. 77,741 (SEC Aug. 5, 1969).
This administrative proceeding was based on alleged misstatements in a schedule 13D
filed by the acquiring company. The hearing officer found the statements materially
misleading under section 13(d). The schedule had been filed in accordance with that sec-
tion after the tender offer had been completed. The holding of the case was appropriately
limited to section 13(d), thus eliminating any determination under section 14(d). (The
misleading statements regarded the acquirer's intentions concerning the acquired com-
pany.) Susquehanna was ordered to file an appropriate amendment to its schedule 13D.
Subsequent judicial consideration of the issue trods the path forged by Electronic. The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that the raider's future intentions
were adequately disclosed in a statement which proclaimed no plan to liquidate or
merge the "target" but reserving the right to review this position in the future. See
Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,610 (5th Cir.
Mar. 13, 1970).
104See SEC v. Parvin/Dohrmann Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. Rar_. 92,500 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 30, 1969).
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Transfer of Corporate Control: Section 14(f)
The cash tender offer facilitates the transfer of corporate control
in the absence of management cooperation; other techniques, e.g., mer-
ger and sale of assets, demand such affiliation.1 05 Once the tender offer
is completed, either "working control" through the existing board of
directors or complete control through a new directorate is possible. 08
Generally, control is effectuated through share voting and whenever
such voting is contemplated, the strict proxy regulations of the Com-
mission must also be accorded substantial notice.' 07 Assuming that the
tender offeror's immediate goal is to acquire control and he is able to
accomplish this objective by simply dealing with a controlling share-
holder, undoubtedly he will do so. The typical situation consists of a
controller selling his shares, at a profit, to the raider. The raider, in
return, may request that the present board of directors resign. The
federal proxy rules are ill-equipped to prevent such forced resignations
and the subsequent installation of the raider's men on the board of
directors. 08 Moreover, it is not entirely clear that a majority share-
105 Where management opposes a more conventional form of acquisition, the tender
offer may be the only way to effect it. As noted, other techniques, such as merger and
asset acquisition, require its support. While the use of the tender offer as an alternative
to merger or sale of assets is not without its costs, it would seem far superior to a proxy
contest as a prelude to gaining control. See generally Fleischer & Mundheim at 318-22.
300 See Swanson at 437-38 & n.22:
Several kinds of control are possible, including (1) complete ownership of the
capital stock, (2) majority ownership, (3) majority ownership with a legal de-
vice, such as pyramiding through holding companies, voting trusts, and issues
of non-voting stock, (4) minority control with shareholders widely and diversely
scattered, (5) management control by self-perpetuation where the majority of
shareholders are too dispersed and disinterested to exert a controlling influence,
(6) proxy control through committees, and (7) interlocking corporate officers
and directors.
107§ 14(a),(b),(c), 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a),(b),(c) (1964);
Regulation 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1 et seq. (1970); Regulation 14C. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-1
et seq. (1970). The philosophy behind the proxy rules is the same as that behind the
Williams Amendments, i.e., to give shareholders the opportunity to intelligently exercise
the rights concomitant to ownership of the corporation. In this instance, the right is the
exercise of the corporate voting franchise. The proxy rules are both technical and vastly
complex, but an important consideration in any corporate take-over when shareholder
voting is required. See generally E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, PRoxy Coz'rssrs foR CoR-
PORATE CONTROL (1968).
108 See Ratner, Section 14(f): A New Approach To Transfers Of Corporate Control,
54 CORNELL L. Rxv. 65 (1968).
The reason that the proxy rules have been inapplicable in these situations is
the provision in most state laws which permits the directors to fill vacancies on
the board in the period between annual meetings. The provision has generally
been interpreted as permitting the entire board to resign seriatim at the direc-
tion of the old "controlling" shareholder and to select designees of the new
"controlling" shareholder to fill their places.
Id. at 66-67.
Compare DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(e) (1967) with N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 705(b)
(McKinney 1963).
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holder violates a fiduciary duty to the corporation or the minority
shareholders by selling his controlling interest. 0 9 However, in view of
the 1964 amendments extending the scope of the 34 Act," 0 and the
judicial approval of shareholder standing to bring action for proxy rule
violation,"' an anomalous situation had developed which permitted a
corporation to be "sold out" without an informed vote of the company's
"owners." The addition of section 14(f)1 2 relieves the problems to a
certain extent" 3 by requiring the requisite proxy information to be
sent to shareholders when resignations and installations on the board
of directors attend the sale of a controlling interest in the corporation. 114
BRIDGE TO EXCHANGE OFFERS
The Williams Amendments have been praised for filling in a
serious gap in our securities regulation" 5 and criticized as insufficient
in their quest for investor protection."" As noted above, however, tender
109 Clearly, the fiduciary duty exists to this extent: the controller cannot deliver
the corporation into the hands of looters whose only intention is to mulct the com-
pany's treasury. It is not equally clear that the controller has a duty to ensure that all
shareholders are afforded the same opportunity to sell their shares. Compare Essex Uni-
versal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1962) with Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d
173 (2d Cir. 1955). See also Andrews, The Stockholder's Right to Equal Opportunity in
the Sale of Shares, 78 HARv. L. REV. 505 (1965); Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Cor-
porate Control, 50 CoaNELL L.Q. 628 (1965).
110 The 1964 Amendments extended the Act's coverage to certain over-the-counter
markets and further required information statements to be sent to all shareholders even
when proxies are not solicited. See generally Phillips & Shipman, An Analysis of the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, 1964 DUKE L.J. 706.
'11 See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
112 The section is not without precedent. Cf. § 16, Investment Company Act of
1940, 54 Stat. 813 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 (1964).
113 § 12(g), 48 Stat. 892 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1964). The coverage
of the 34 Act reaches companies having more than 500 shareholders or more than one
million dollars in assets.
114 The section does not cover "the situation where a transfer of effective control
is achieved by a change of less than a majority of the board or by a sale of less than
ten percent of the outstanding shares." Ratner, supra note 108, at 69. See also 6 Loss
8663.
115 See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 107, at 585-99; W. PAINTER, FEDERAL.
REGULATION OF INsmER TRADING 317-47 (1968); Hornstein, Corporations, 1968 ANN. SURVEY
oF AM. L. 59, 66-67. See also Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means on
the Subject of Tax Reform, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, at 2363-76 (1969) (remarks of
Mr. Budge).
116 [w]hether (or not] the Williams Bill goes far enough in protecting investors
or the public interest .... [i]t is arguable that there are more basic public con-
cerns than any to which the . . . Bill is directly addressed . .. including such
things as undue extension or concentration of economic power; overextension of
management; control of enterprise by sinister forces; and speculative excesses, in-
cluding excessive short-term borrowing or excessive leverage, pyramiding or di-
lution, with resulting jeopardy not to [the target's] investors but to [the
acquirer's].
Cohen, supra note 12, at 619.
Several states have followed the lead of Congress in the regulation of cash tender
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offers are merely another technique for the acquisition of corporate
control, the more traditional modes of which have included, among
others, stock exchange offers. The functional utility of the cash tender
offer subsisted in what in fact has amounted to a complete lack of
federal regulation. The stock exchange offer, on the other hand, is
deemed an issuance of stock and accordingly is subject to the onus of
registration and Commission approval prior to the actual exchange.
Inasmuch as the 1968 amendments have seriously impeded the relative
value of the cash tender offer as an acquisition device, a raider in
assessing prospective "targets" must consider the individual merits
of each alternative. While clearly a Hobson's choice, recent data would
seem to indicate a preference for the rigors of the exchange offer.
Whether this conversion is a result of the prophylactic measures
of the Williams Act or the difficulty of financing cash tender offers in
an era of "tight" money, the stock-for-stock exchange has acquired a
renewed respectability.117 In an exchange offer, a raider offers to trade
his securities for those of the "target's" shareholders. For all intents
and purposes, the transaction is one which requires the cooperation of
incumbent management. 1 8 The exchange of stock constitutes a sale
for the purpose of the 33 Act and consequently must be registered with
the Commission." 9 The 33 Act does provide, however, certain exemp-
offers. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-528-13.1-541 (Cum. Supp. 1968); OHio REv. CODE
ANN. § 1707.041 (Page 1969).
The Ohio provisions are far more prophylactic than the federal regulation. Un-
like the Williams Act, the Ohio law, which became effective Oct. 9, 1969, is aimed at
annihilating the cash tender offer. The state law requires a tender offeror to make public
the terms of his bid at least 20 days before the offer is officially made.
117 In an exchange offer, the offeror in effect prints his own financing. Unlike a
cash tender offer, there is no need to hold outside financing together and there
is no outsider, such as a bank, to act as a check on the soundness of the original
or subsequent offers. In addition, as makers of exchange offers issue new types
of securities to effect takeovers, the financial structures of their companies be-
come more complex and, consequently, the merits of the exchange more difficult
to evaluate.
Mundheim, supra note 60, at 956. See also Hamilton, supra note 34, at 270 & n.2.
118 Absent such affiliation, an effective prospectus will be all but impossible to pre-
pare. Equally important is the cooperation of the "target's" shareholders. Their action
is voluntary, i.e., each shareholder is free to accept or reject the offer on an individual
basis. Conceptually, the prospectus must be provided so that the shareholder will be
able to make an intelligent decision. But see Kennedy at 1103 wherein the author ob-
serves:
In effect, the prospectus resembles a proxy statement prepared in connection
with a merger; it is a formidable and lengthy document incomprehensible to
most shareholders.
119 § 2(3), 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § .77b(3) (1964). "The term 'sale'
or 'sell' shall include every contract of sale or disposition of a security or interest in a
security, for value." See United States v. Wernes, 157 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1946); United
States v. Ridel, 126 F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1942).
The form required to be filed for a stock-for-stock exchange is the lengthy S-l,
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tions from its registration provisions which may be invoked where a
company falls neatly within the mandates of these sections.120 The prob-
lem of premature disclosure, however, attends registered exchange offers
and registered offerings generally. The difficulty ordinarily materializes
during the pre-filing period when an agreement has been reached but
no registration statement has been filed with the Commission. Con-
sequently, any announcement may be interpreted as soliciting pros-
pective purchasers for the stock of the combined company in violation
of the 33 Act.
Jumping the Gun
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp.,121 demonstrates
the problem of releasing information prior to the filing and effective
date of the registration statement. Chris-Craft evidenced an interest in
acquiring the Piper Aircraft Corporation in January of 1969. It quietly
began picking up Piper shares on the open market. Subsequently, it
made an exchange offer with Piper shareholders in which Chris-Craft
mustered 34 percent of the outstanding shares. Following this episode,
Chris-Craft proposed to make a follow-up exchange offer but met with
opposition from the Piper family.
17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1970). See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968). See also
G. MCCARTHY, ACQuIsITIONS AND MERGERS 187 (1963) [hereinafter G. McCARTHY].
The raider must submit certain information in the S-1 concerning the "target."
Embarking on an exchange offer without the cooperation of incumbent management in
the preparation of the S-1 is unwise. Section 11 of the 33 Act provides express relief for
shareholders injured by misstatements or omissions in the registration statement. 48
Stat. 82 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1964). Like other anti-fraud sections, a
section 11 action is based upon untrue statements of material facts. However, "material"
is defined as "those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought reasonably
to be informed before purchasing the security registered." Rule 405(1), 17 C.F.R.
§ 230A05(1) (1970). In a very real sense, the registrant must make "full disclosure."
Additionally, a suitor under section 11 need not be in privity with the defendant in
his action. He may sue the corporation, its directors, the underwriters of the issue, experts
named in the registration statement and any person who has signed the statement.
Furthermore, a plaintiff in a section 11 action does not have to prove that the defendant
knew of the false or omitted statements. Ordinarily, a plaintiff will not have to show
that he relied on the false or omitted statements. Concerning the amount of care re-
quired in preparing a registration statement, see Escott v. Bar-Chris Constr. Corp., 283
F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally 3 Loss 1721-42.
The required information about the "target" includes a summary of its earnings,
its organization, affiliates or parents if any, a description of its business and property,
and any pending legal proceedings.
120 48 Stat. 75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c (1964) (exempted securities); 48
Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1964) (exempted transactions). See generally
1 Loss 559-708. If any exemption is satisfied, the company will be able to avoid the ex-
pensive and time-consuming process of filing a prospectus. Cf. C. SCHNEIDER & J. MANKO,
GOING PUBLIC PRATICE, PROCEDURE AND CONSEQUENCES 21-25 (1969).
121 CCH FED. SEC. L. RE'. 92,510 (2d Cir. Nov. 6, 1969), aff'd en banc, 92,648
(2d Cir. Apr. 28, 1970).
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Seeking to prevent Chris-Craft from assuming control, the family
advised the Piper shareholders that the offer was inadequate. In defense
they sought to effect a merger with the Grumman Company, a venture
which failed to materialize but which did effectively limit the success
of the Chris-Craft offer. Throughout the proceedings, the Bangor Punta
Corporation retained an interest in Piper, contingent upon acquiring
the Piper family holdings. As a result of the family's militant opposition
to Chris-Craft, negotiations were resumed with Bangor. An agreement
was subsequently reached whereby Bangor was to receive the Piper
family holdings in return for which it promised to use its best efforts
to acquire control of Piper and thereby eliminate the Chris-Craft
threat.122 Eventually, mutual press releases 23 were issued by Bangor
and Piper concerning the proposed merger and exchange offer. How-
ever, Bangor never filed a registration statement covering the proposed
issuance and the Commission quickly moved to prevent further adver-
tisement of the transaction. Through mutual consent, a permanent in-
junction was entered which prohibited Bangor and Piper from offering
to sell or selling the proposed securities until a registration statement
was filed.124 Subsequently, Bangor complied by filing the requisite
statement. However, by this time Bangor had received numerous
tenders pursuant to its exchange offer and also acquired some 120,000
shares for cash on the open market while the exchange offer was in
operation. Chris-Craft brought an action to restrain Bangor from ac-
cepting the shares tendered pursuant to the exchange offer, from voting
122 The exchange offer, which Bangor proposed to make to Piper shareholders in
order to gain control, provided that each share of Piper common would be exchanged
for Bangor securities and/or cash having a value of $80 or more. Furthermore, Bangor
agreed that if it could obtain control, it would ensure that the Piper family received the
same consideration that was ultimately given to the other shareholders.
123 The releases provided in pertinent part:
Bangor Punta has agreed to file a registration statement with the SEC cov-
ering a proposed exchange offer for any and all of the remaining outstanding
shares of Piper Aircraft for a package of Bangor Punta securities to be valued in
the judgment of the First Boston Corporation at not less than $80 per Piper
share.
Sales of the combined companies would reach $450,000,000 in fiscal 1969,
with approximately $180,000,000, or 40%, in the aircraft, recreational and leisure
time fields.
Id. at 98,374.
124 SEC v. Bangor Punta Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,428 (D.).C. May 26,
1969). The defendants consented to the entrance of the injunction without admitting
any of the substantive allegations of the complaint. The complaint was based on the
mutual press releases which contained the $80 value placed on the Bangor package of
securities, the projected sales earnings of the combined operation, the expression of the
Piper family's desire to see the merger effectuated and the announced intention to file
a registration statement. All of these things presumably constituted an offering to induce
investors to purchase Bangor securities in violation of § 5(c), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1964), since no registration statement was in effect.
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the shares purchased through the cash transactions and from cementing
a merger with Piper.
The district court, in opinions by Judge Tenney, refused the re-
quested relief, reasoning that the contested press release was neither
an offer to sell nor a solicitaton of an offer to buy in the first instance. 125
Furthermore, as a separate trial to determine whether the cash pur-
chases during the life of the exchange offer violated rule lOb-6126 would
not be in the interest of efficient judicial administration, it was de-
nied.127
In a two-to-one determination, the Court of Appeals for the Se-
cond Circuit reversed. 128 It was clear, at least to Judges Waterman and
Kaufman,129 that the press release estimating the value of the exchanged
125 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,465
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 1969). As the exact terms of the exchange had not been determined,
the parties could do no more in the interests of their shareholders, than they did by
making the press releases in question.
The court also found that certain letters which Mr. Piper had sent to the share-
holders urging acceptance of the Bangor offer, were not violative of section 14(e) because
no reference was made to the possible increased consideration the Piper family would
receive after Bangor achieved control. Judge Tenney held that this provision was
designed to compensate the Piper family for having fixed the exchange for their personal
holdings more than two months prior to the actual exchange offer and at a lower price
than the deal offered to the public.
[I]t merely provided protection for the Piper family should the market value of
the securities they were to receive be less than the value of the securities offered
to other Piper holders.
Id. at 98,204.
126 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1970) which prohibits an underwriter, an issuer or a broker
participating in such distribution from bidding for or purchasing the securities in
which he has a beneficial interest or are the subject matter of the proposed distribution.
It also prevents soliciting "buy" orders while the party engages in the distribution.
127 Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,467
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 1969).
It must be remembered ... that both Chris-Craft and Bangor Punta are seeking
to gain control of Piper. Even assuming, arguendo, that a trial on this separate
issue would indicate a violation by Bangor Punta of Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-6
and that divestiture should be ordered, and, further, that Chris-Craft were able
to purchase every one of these 120,200 shares of Piper stock, plaintiff would still
have failed to achieve the end which has provided the motivation for this suit,
that is, control of Piper.
Id. at 98,213.
Chris-Craft alleged that when they had made their exchange offer, the Commission
warned them that any purchasing done outside the offer would violate rule I0b-6. It
seemed logical that the same proviso would be applicable to Bangor Punta.
128 By the time this appeal was argued Bangor had attained 52.7 percent of the
outstanding shares while Chris-Craft had 46.2 percent. Accordingly, the Second Circuit
refused to grant a preliminary injunction, concluding that since any possible harm to
Chris-Craft had already been consummated, there would be no danger that Chris-Craft
would suffer irreparable damage. CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 92,510, at 98,375, citing
Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1966). Furthermore, Bangor assured
the court that no merger would be effected prior to the outcome of the litigation.
129 When it is announced that securities will be sold at some date in the future
and, in addition, an attractive description of these securities and of the issuer is
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securities at $80 was an offer to sell within the contemplation of sec-
tion 5(c);:30 nor did this offer come within the exemptions of rule
135.131 The liability-producing error was in fixing a price on the value
of the exchange, because this estimate tended to encourage a formulation
of the stock's value in the minds of prospective purchasers, without
the benefit of a prospectus to aid them in their decision.
Although Bangor had contended that the information had to be
disclosed under the present test of materiality,132 the court held that
the only material fact required to be revealed was its commitment to
offer its securities for the Piper securities; there was no compulsion to
disclose a market value.13 3 Consequently, the press release violated
section 5(c) and the court remanded this issue for a determination of
the appropriate remedy.
Unlike Judge Tenney, the Second Circuit considered the lOb-6
allegation. Judge Waterman explained that a primary purpose of the
rule is to prevent market manipulation by the issuer. Bangor contended
that its purchases on the open market could only drive the stock's price
up and thus make its exchange offer less attractive. The court disagreed
reasoning that "this argument overlooks the decided benefits that pur-
chases of target company stock can produce for the initiator of an ex-
change offer."' 3 4 The true effect of this sort of manipulation is that it
prods many investors into believing that the stock's rise is due solely to
the "bullish" effect the exchange offer has upon the market. "Preven-
tion of this kind of manipulation seems well within the spirit of Rule
furnished, it seems clear that such an announcement provides much the same
kind of information as that contained in a prospectus.
CCH FED. SEC. L. RPi. 92,510, at 98,376.
13048 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to make use of any
means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails to offer to sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of
any prospectus or otherwise any security, unless a registration statement has
been filed as to such security ....
131 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (1970) allows certain notices to be sent by an issuer without
incurring liability for offering a security for sale. These include: notice to shareholders
that certain stock subscription rights are going to be issued to them; notice that securities
are going to be offered in exchange for the shares which are presently held; notice to
employees that a stock offering is going to be made to them.
132 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 894
U.S. 976 (1969); NEw YoRK STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL, at A-19 (1969).
133 Had Bangor Punta revealed the titles of the securities it proposed to offer
and revealed the basis or ratio on which the exchange was proposed to be made,
as the Rule [135] permits, all the essential parts of the proposed transaction
would have been placed before the public and the potentially misleading esti-
mate of value would have been avoided.
CCH FED. SEC. L. RP. 92,510 at 98,377.
1341 d. at 98,378.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
lOb-6. It is within the letter of the Rule as well."'85 Since the rule
prohibits not only purchasing shares while an offer is pending but also
purchasing any right to purchase such security, the court saw the
Piper shares as carrying a right to acquire Bangor securities and there-
fore technically within the ambit of the rule. Judge Waterman admitted
that Bangor might be able to show that these purchases fell within the
rule's exemption, i.e., that they were unsolicited purchases effected
neither on a securities exchange nor from or through a broker or dealer
but this defense would have to be undertaken at trial.
Chief Judge Lumbard filed a dissenting opinion in which he
agreed with Judge Tenney. Like the majority, he believed that Texas
Gulf Sulphur required the press releases, since the agreement with the
Piper family constituted material information. However, he also be-
lieved that the $80 figure was required to be revealed. 8 6 Because of
the myriad of people that would be working on the exchange offer (e.g.,
accountants, escrow agents, bankers, printers), the likelihood of the in-
formation leaking out to people anxious to capitalize on such news
was great, but the likelihood of policing the activities of such a corpu-
lent group was very small. In this situation, it was much better that
the Piper shareholders learn of the exchange offer and its terms.
In consideration of rule lOb-6, the dissent noted that the majority
was unnecessarily stretching the concept embodied in that rule. "Rule
1Ob-6 seeks to prevent the manipulation of the price of shares which
are the subject of a current or impending public offering."' 37 The rule
is highly technical and of limited application, i.e., to an offering com-
pany purchasing its own shares on the market during a public offering
in order to buoy the market price up to that fixed for the distri-
bution.188
The ulitmate impact of the Second Circuit's decision is to affirm the
135 Id.
136 While the $80 figure may seem more difficult to justify, under the circum-
stances its announcement was the only course open to Bangor Punta. Responding
to the problem of valuation, Rule 135(c)(4) provides for notification of "the
basis upon which the exchange is proposed to be made .... "
Although not free from doubt, in the light of Texas Gulf I would read this
provision as requiring announcement of the $80 figure.
Id. at 98,379 (dissenting opinion).
137 1d. at 98,381 (dissenting opinion).
138 Similarly polarized to the majority's opinion concerning violation of rule lOb-6,
but on different grounds is Mr. Lowenfels' argument:
The court's rationale does not appear persuasive. If it is important that target
company stockholders be informed with respect to cash purchases outside of an
existing exchange offer, then the proper course is to require public disclosure of
such purchases as soon as they are consummated. To prohibit such purchases
entirely seems an unnecessary encroachment upon the functioning of a free
market and will tend to prevent the very enhancement in market value which
the target company stockholder desires.
Lowenfels, supra note 100, at 1406.
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Commission's position.139 However, it does not alleviate the confusion
which has attended the pre-filing and waiting periods for registration
statements. It has been noted that the score in the Bangor-Chris-Craft
litigation is tied-two-to-two on the issue of "gun jumping" (i.e.,
Judges Waterman and Kaufman for, and Judges Lumbard and Tenney
against)., 40 This characterization certainly attests to some residual un-
certainty; but stealing the Second Circuit's thunder in its "solution" is
a recent study'41 and its recommendations, designed to ease the confu-
sion pervading the "gun jumping" doctrine.
Ti WHEAT REPORT
Recognizing the sound policy in restricting materials which may
solicit buyer interest in a proposed offering, the Wheat Study Group
set out to clarify the restrictions and harmonize them with recently ex-
panded timely disclosure policies. As to determining whether a proposed
release during the waiting or pre-filing period is forbidden, many cases
are so unequivocal that a decision can be reached without lengthy de-
liberation. In those cases which are not so readily resolved, the Study
recommends consultation with the Commission's staff to obviate any
confusion: "The Study knows of no substitute for this procedure and
issuers are encouraged to employ it."''
139 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 3844 (Oct. 8, 1957). Accord, SEC v. Arvida
Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades S: Co. & Dominick
& Dominick, 38 S.E.C. 843 (1959). The SEC position is that section 5 prohibits issuers,
underwriters or dealers from beginning their public sales campaign prior to the effective-
ness of a registration statement. A sales campaign may be initiated in newspaper or
magazine interviews, in speeches or on radio or television or in reports to stockholders.
The prime purpose of the 33 Act is to slow down the distribution process so that inves-
tors can make an intelligent decision concerning a propoged offering. This purpose is
frustrated when particles of information are revealed out of context in order to tempt the
investors' buying instinct. See 38 S.E.C. at 849-50. See also 1 Loss 212-23; Gadsby, Cur-
rent Problems Under Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Release No. 3844, 13
Bus. LA w. 358 (1958).
140 See Address by John E. Tobin, Practising Law Institute, First Annual Securities
Regulation Institute, New York City, Nov. 7, 1969. Subsequent determination by the
Second Circuit tips the delicate balance toward the Waterman opinion. See CCH ED.
SEC. L. REP. 92,648 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 1970).
141 SacuarriEs AND EXCHANGE ComimioN, DxscLosuax To INVEsTORs, A REAP1PRAIsAL
or FEDERAL ADmINISTRATIVw PoLIcIEs UNDER THE '33 AND '34 Acs (CCH ed. 1969) [herein-
after THE WHEAT REPORT]. (The Report also contains a series of separately paginated
Appendices, containing recommendations in rule form. Appropriately, each shall be re-
ferred to as Appendix.) See also Schulman, Book Review, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1374 (1969).
142 THE WHEAT REsoRT at 132. The Study was satisfied that the Commission's
policies and procedures on this aspect of the problem were adequate. It was more con-
cerned with the timely disclosure problem although it stated that any conflict which
would arise between an obligation to disclose and "gun jumping" would be a rare case.
[S]uch a question will not arise very often in view of the fact that events creating
a duty to make prompt disclosure .. . are relatively infrequent and consequently
will not often occur during the period when the "gun jumping" doctrine inhibits
corporate publicity.
Id. at 138.
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As to timely disclosure, the Study would simplify the situation by
exempting instances where the issuer in good faith determines that dis-
closure is required and the release "is purely factual and does not
include predictions, conclusions or opinions.' ' 43
Acting upon the Report's recommendations in this instance, the
Commission concurred with their findings, but believed the conflict to
be "more apparent than real."'144 It should be evident that this situa-
tion, if it does arise, would occur during the pre-filing period. During
the waiting period, i.e., between the filing of the registration statement
and its effectiveness, communications with prospective investors should
be restricted to "red herrings,"' 45 "tombstone" ads146 and the announce-
ments permitted by rule 135.147 The Commission has also accepted the
1431d. at 133.
144 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5009 (Oct. 7, 1969).
Disclosure of a material event would ordinarily not be subject to restrictions
under Section 5 • . .if it is purely factual and does not include predictions or
opinions . . .. [When close questions arise we encourage] issuers and their
counsel to seek informal consultation with the Commission's staff which is ac-
customed to dealing with such questions and is usually able to give rapid and
definite responses.
145"Red herrings" are preliminary prospectuses which are identical to the final
prospectus except that price and other unavailable information is omitted. It also con-
tains a legend announcing that a registration statement has been filed but has not
become effective; that the information therein contained is subject to change; and that
the "herring" is not to be considered an offer to sell securities. The Commission permits
these prospectuses through rules promulgated under § 10(b), 48 Stat. 81 (1933), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1964). See also Rule 433, 17 C.F.R. § 230.433 (1970) (the
preliminary prospectus); Rule 434, 17 C.F.R. § 230.434 (1970) (summary prospectus pre-
pared by independent organizations summarily containing the information required in
the preliminary prospectus); Rule 434a, 17 C.F.R. § 230.434a (1970) (summary prospectus
filed as part of the registration statement).
It should be noted that oral efforts to sell during the waiting period are permissible.
However, acceptances of the solicited "buy" orders are not allowed until after the
registration statement has become effective. See C. SCHNEIDER & J. MANKO, supra note
120, at 17-18.
146 The "tombstone" ad or identifying statement is not considered a prospectus dur-
ing the waiting and post effective periods for purposes of section 2(10), 48 Stat. 74 (1933),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1964) (definition of prospectus). See also Rule 134, 17
C.F.R. § 230.134 (1970) which contains the permissible contents of the advertisement.
The reason these ads are allowed is that conceptually they are not intended to be
selling documents but rather instruments to give the issuer some idea of the number
of people that would be interested in receiving a prospectus. See SEC Securities Act
Release No. 3224 (June 6, 1947). See generally 1 Loss 223-45.
147 The Wheat Study realized that many issuers contemplating a public offering
make limited announcements concerning their decision in spite of the fact that the SEC
might consider this practice to be "gun jumping" if no registration statement has been
filed. Consequently, the Study recommends that these limited announcements in the pre-
filing period be allowed. See TE WHEAT REPORT at 134; Appendix VII-2 at 1 (proposed
amendment to rule 135).
In SEC Securities Act Release No. 5010 (Oct. 7, 1969), the Commission adopted this
recommendation by proposing to allow limited announcements identifying the security,
stating the amount of securities expected to be registered and the approximate dollar
amount and time of the offering (proposed rule 135(a)(1)).
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recommendations1 48 which would allow an issuer in a statutory merger,
consolidation or asset acquisition involving an offer of securities, to
make limited announcements containing the name of the issuer, the
title of securities involved, the basis of the exchange and the expected
date of the transaction.149
"Gun jumping" also presents some very real problems to the
broker/dealer which arise when he participates in an underwriting.
The independence of his judgment in making recommendations is in
question and gives rise to "the old conflict of interest between his func-
tions as a 'broker' and as a 'dealer'" because of the additional consid-
eration he may be receiving. Evidently, such questions do not arise in
the absence of an underwriting. As "[i]t is apparent that a considerable
uncertainty pervades the application of [the] 33 Act restrictions to the
publication activities of brokers and investment advisers,"' 18 0 the central
question then is when may a broker/dealer publicize his judgments and
recommendations coricerning various securities.'r'
Upon the Report's recommendations 152 the Commission has pro-
posed certain rules to salve the broker/dealer's dilemma.15 3 Proposed
rule 137 permits a person having no arrangements with the participants
to an underwriting to publish information concerning an issuer whose
securities are in registration. The recommendations made can only be
in regard to issuers subject to the filing requirements of the 34 Act,154
and the non-participant must receive no consideration for his act.155
148 Appendix VII-2 at 1.
149 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5010 (Oct. 7, 1969) (proposed rule 135(a)(4)). The
release states that this amendment is necessary in light of proposed changes in rule 133
requiring registration of securities issued in certain business combinations. See notes
185-91 infra and accompanying text.
150 Tan WH AT REPORT at 138.
151 The Study gives the following example:
[O]ne leading brokerage firm stated that it had been unable to include in its
regular quarterly survey of stocks on its recommended list any recommendation
concerning American Telephone and Telegraph for a period of two years, for
the reason that AT&T was always "in registration" during this period, This was
so, even though the brokerage firm was not a member of any underwriting
syndicate or selling group for the security ....
Another leading brokerage firm ... refrains from publishing a recommen-
dation concerning a security in registration only when it will be included in the
underwriting group.
Id. at 137.
152Appendix V-l, V-2, V-3.
153 SEC Securities Act Release No. 5010 (Oct. 7, 1969) (proposed rules 137, 138, 139).
154 § 13, 48 Stat. (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (Supp. IV 1969); § 15(d),
48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (1964).
255A broker/dealer who is participating in an offering will also be free to make
recommendations by virtue of proposed rules 138 and 139. Proposed rule 138 will
permit him to publish recommendations about an issuer's common stock when he
participates in that issuer's offering of non-convertible, debt or preferred stock which
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The proposed additions to the Commission's rules on "gun jump-
ing" clarify many gray areas that could lead and may have led to many
unwillful violations of the securities law. Parenthetically, however,
these additions would not assuage Bangor Punta's violation, for even
under these proposals a violation was embodied in the predicted earn-
ings of the combined enterprise. The recent addition of rule lOb-13
would also prohibit the cash purchases which Bangor made on the
market during its offer.
A "DECORATIVE CURLICUE'":1 6 THE SALE IS NOT A SALE
As has been previously noted, there are certain take-over situations
wherein registration under the 33 Act is not required. Consequently,
many raiders avail themselves of these exemptions in effecting a cor-
porate take-over. Perhaps the most noble and notable is provided by
SEC rule 133,157 the notorious "no-sale" rule. The rule is applicable
to mergers, consolidations or reclassifications of securities, and stock-
for-assets acquisitions, accomplished through a stockholder vote of the
acquired corporation when such vote is required by state law or by
the corporation's certificate. The requisite vote must bind all of the
corporation's shareholders, although dissenters' appraisal rights remain
intact. 1 However, the rule is not intended to be a license to flood the
country with unregistered securities, and therefore contains restrictions
covering subsequent offerings of the exempted securities. The express
restrictions in the rule itself provide sufficient problems to a claimant
of the registration exemption. Additionally, the rule is jaundiced with
an administrative gloss which has developed over the years. 159
is registered on form S-7 or S-9. Proposed rule 139 permits him to publish recommen-
dations in a market letter or industry survey when he participates in an offering of an
issuer subject to section 15(d) of the 34 Act or who has securities registered under
section 12 of that Act. The permissible publication must be one that has been dis-
tributed with some regularity for at least two years. The recommendation of his issuer's
security must not be given "special prominence" or more favorable treatment than it has
been given in the past.
1561 have a particular fondness for the many decorative curlicues and imagina-
tive interpretations with which [the Securities Act of 1933] has been embellished
over the years.
Speech by former SEC Chairman Manuel F. Cohen, ALI-ABA Conference on Current
Problems of Broker-Dealer Regulations, Washington, D.C., June 7, 1968, quoted in,
Schneider, Acquisitions Under The Federal Securities Acts-A Program For Reform,
116 U. PA. L. REv. 1323, 1358 n.95 (1968) [hereinafter Schneider].
157 17 C.F.R. § 230.138 (1970).
158 Rule 183(a) also allows a subsidiary to do the acquiring when the stock offered in
a stock for assets acquisition is that of the parent corporation if the parent owns at least
80 percent of the subsidiary's total voting power and 80 percent of all other outstanding
shares of the "puppet." 17 CX.R. § 230.133(a) (1970).
159 See Kennedy, The Case of the Scarlet Letter, 28 Bus. LAw. 23 (1967).
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The origins of the rule are based upon a "no-sale" theory in which
the shareholders of a corporation are deemed an autonomous group
embodying corporate action in approving the merger or acquisition;
presumably there is no individual action.16 0 The theory was an un-
mitigated one, naturally leading to abuse and subsequent SEC limita-
tion for section 5 purposes only. 161 Furthermore, the Commission in
the Great Sweet Grass Oils' 62 litigation held that the 133 exemption
does not create "free" stock perpetually liberated from registration;
subsequent distributions of the stock must be registered. Nor will a pre-
conceived plan to evade registration under the rule, i.e., where the
shareholders are used "merely as a conduit for distributing a substantial
amount of securities to the public,"'' 1 3 or where the exchange is only a
"step in the major activity of selling the stock,"'' 64 be condoned. Most
significantly, the rule was held inapplicable where the negotiators have
such control of the voting power as to render the vote a mere formal-
ity.15
In 1959, the rule was amended to its present form, containing cer-
tain express proscriptions from its utilization.166 The rule triggers the
registration requirements of section 5 when securities acquired in a
133 transaction are subsequently offered for sale by those considered
underwriters in the 2(1 1)167 sense, and therefore subject to registration.
They include any person who purchases securities previously issued in
180 See National Supply Co. v. Leland Stanford Junior University, 134 F.2d 689, 694
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 773 (1943).
161 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 3965 (Sept. 15, 1958). For the history of
rule 133, see generally 1 Loss 518-42; Cohen, Rule 133 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 14 RcoRa oF N.Y.C.B.A. 162 (1959); Sargent, A Review of the "No-Sale"
Theory of Rule 133, 13 Bus. LAw. 78 (1957).
182In re Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd. & Kroy Oils, Ltd., 37 S.E.C. 683 (1957), aff'd
per curiam sub noma. Great Sweet Grass Oils, Ltd. v. SEC, 256 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
petition for review withdrawn sub noma. Kroy Oils, Ltd. v. SEC, No. 13,920 (D.C. Cir.
Dec. 10, 1958).
163 37 S.E.C. at 691.
164 Id. The Commission was impressed with and consequently adopted the reason-
ing utilized in SEC v. Micro-Moisture Controls, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)
(preliminary injunction), 167 F. Supp. 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (final injunction), aff'd sub
nom. SEC v. Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1959).
105 The ratiocination in this situation being- "the transaction is not corporate action
in a real sense, but rather is action reflecting the consent of the persons in control, and
consequently results in a 'sale' as to them." 37 S.E.C. at 691.
168 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4115 (July 16, 1959); SEC Securities Act Re-
lease No. 4077 (May 4, 1959). See also Comment, Recent Developments In The No-Sale
Theory Under The Securities Act of 1933: Proposed Revision of Rule 133, 47 CALM. L.
Rr v. 112 (1959).
16748 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1964) (definition of under-
writer).
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a 133 transaction from shareholders of a constituent corporation 68
with a view toward distributing the shares. Also included are those who
offer or sell these securities with a view toward distribution pursuant
to a contract or arrangement made with the issuer, an affiliate of the
issuer, or a person who, in connection with the transaction, is acting as
an underwriter of the securities. 16 9 Additionally, a controlling share-
holder of the acquired corporation is considered an underwriter in
the 133 transaction and must register his shares before any sale can be
perfected. 70 However, this controlling shareholder may, in limited
circumstances, be permitted to sell a small amount of the shares when
accomplished via brokers transactions.' 7 ' When invoking the leakage
provisions, "buy" orders for the securities may not be solicited. The
only person who may be compensated in the transaction is the broker.
And finally, only certain amounts of the securities can be sold within
a six month period. 7 2
168 Rule 133(f) defines a constituent corporation as any corporation, other than the
issuer, which is a party to the 133 transaction described in section (a) of the rule, e.g.,
the acquired corporation.
Section (f) also defines an affiliate as "a person controlling, controlled by or under
common control with a specified person." 17 C.F.R. § 230.133() (1970).
169 Rule 133(b). This section also provides that its proscription is inapplicable to
arrangements made in connection with a 133 transaction which allow shareholders
to sell or purchase fractional interests in order to make their holdings whole interests.
17 C..R. § 230.133(b) (1970).
170 Rule 133(c). When the constituent corporation transfers shares of the issuer to
its own shareholders upon its complete or partial liquidation, there is no distribution
involved. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(c) (1970).
171 § 4(4), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(4) (1964) exempts from the
provisions of section 5 "brokers' transactions executed upon customers' orders on any
exchange or in the over-the-counter market, but not the solicitation of such orders."
Rule 133(e) implements the above definition as follows:
"brokers" transactions [include] . . . transactions by a broker acting as agent
for the account of the seller where (a) the broker performs no more than the
usual and customary brokers' functions, (b) the broker does no more than
execute an order or orders to sell as a broker and receives no more than the
usual or customary brokers' commissions, (c) the broker does not solicit or
arrange for the solicitation of orders to buy in anticipation of or in connection
with such transactions and (d) the broker is not aware of any circumstances
indicating that his principal is failing to comply with [133(d)].
The term "solicitation of such orders" includes solicitations of "buy" orders but not
solicitations of "sell" orders.
If within the 60 days prior to the broker's transactions, he has received from a
dealer a written bid for a security or a written solicitation of an offer to sell, a subse-
quent inquiry regarding the state of that dealer's bid or solicitation is not considered
an unexempted brokers' solicitation. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(e) (1970).
172 Rule 133(d). Specifically, the amounts permitted are "approximately one percent of
the shares or units of such security outstanding at the time of receipt by the broker of
the order to execute such transactions" if the security is not traded on an exchange.
If the security is traded on an exchange, the permissible amount is either this "one
percent" provision or "the largest aggregate reported volume of trading on securities
exchanges during any one week within four calendar weeks preceding the receipt of
such order," whichever is smaller. 17 C.F.R. § 230.133(d) (1970).
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An isolated examination of the rule breeds this conclusion-
securities acquired in a 133 transaction may be resold without regis-
tration if the seller is neither an underwriter nor an affiliate of a con-
stituent corporation. This class of seller will normally include a non-
controlling shareholder of the acquired corporation. The acquired
corporation and its controlling shareholders may only sell their shares
within the leakage provisions of 133(d); other sales must be registered
on the simplified form S-14.173 If this form is not available and no other
exemption can be found, a formal registration statement must be filed.
Ostensibly, rule 133 may seem complicated enough, however, the
administrative gloss previously referred to, must also be considered.
Several of these policies seem to be well-settled and understood. For
instance, it is recognized that rule 133 exempts the subject securities
from registration but not from the anti-fraud provisions of the Act.17 4
Additionally, the rule applies to mergers and stock-for-assets acquisi-
tions, but not stock-for-stock adventures.'7 5 Other policies are less trans-
parent. For example, the negotiated transaction rule born in the Great
Sweet Grass Oils case, but not incorporated into the 1959 revision of
the rule, is still enforced.17 6 Determination of a controlling person is not
as easy as it may first appear, since the Commission may regard family,
business or personal associates as a single entity for 133 purposes. (Par-
ticularly in determining the amount of securities which may be sold
under the leakage provisions.) 7T
These examples are just a few of the varied interpretations which
confronted securities specialists and have generated inconsistent opin-
ions as to the present state of the law. Once again, the Wheat Study
173 17 C.F.R. § 239.28 (1970). The form is available only "if the registrant was sub-
ject to, and solicited proxies from its stockholders with respect to such transaction in
accordance with the provisions of Regulation 14A" of the 34 Act. This simplified
registration statement may consist of the registrants proxy statement plus information
concerning the proposed distribution, the results of the original 133 transaction, ma-
terial developments in the issuer's business and recent financial information. Moreover,
the registrant must keep the S-14 current for two years pursuant to an undertaking agree-
ment. See generally 1 Loss 537; Sommer, Mergers, Consolidations, Sales of Assets- Rule
133, 16 W. REs. L. REV. 11 (1964); Throop, Recent Developments With Respect To Rule
133, 15 Bus. LAw. 119, 125-150 (1959).
174 See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969). See also G. McCARTHY at 175;
Schneider at 1348 & n.71.
175 See A. CHOKA at 20; Schneider at 1324. But see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.170a
(Supp. 1967); N.Y. BANKING LAw. § 143(a) (McKinney Supp. 1969) requiring a shareholder
vote in certain stock-for-stock transactions. Possibly rule 133 would be applicable under
these conditions although this is not dear. See Schneider at 1335 n.40.
170 See Schneider at 1325 & n.5.
177 See Strathmore Securities, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8207
(Dec. 13, 1967) (19 shareholders adduced a control group). The case is criticized in
Schneider at 1327 & nn.9-10.
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Group grappled with the confusion in the hope of clarifying the de-
mands of the federal securities law, thus lending the law greater opera-
tional efficiency. 7 8
The Study's concern with the state of the "negotiated transaction"
exemption was bolstered by the SEC's refusal to grant "no action"
letters where the acquired company has only a few shareholders. The
Commission has also refused to grant "no action" letters where the
acquiring company has only a few shareholders, 7 9 or where "if the
transaction were structured otherwise than as a merger or sale of assets,
the issue of the new shares would clearly amount to a private place-
ment." 8 0
Another problem is the product of the disparity between the re-
porting requirements of the 33 and the 34 Acts. 8 ' Essentially, when a
company is acquired in a 133 transaction and that company is not
subject to the reporting requirements of section 12 of the 34 Act, the
voting shareholders may receive no information concerning the pro-
posed merger or acquisition. When the company is subject to the
reporting requirements, the shareholders are at least assured of receiv-
ing a proxy statement concerning the transaction. Aside from all other
considerations, our securities laws strive to protect the investor against
a vote cast in ignorance.
The Study also criticized rule 133's reclassification of a controlling
shareholder as a triumph of form over substance.
A shareholder of the acquired corporation ought not to be deemed
an underwriter following a statutory merger or sale of assets if he
is not so regarded following a voluntary exchange of securities, and
vice-versa. If the acquired corporation is publicly held, if there has
178 THE WHFAT RFPORT at 251-96.
179 Refusing "no action" letters in this situation is designed to frustrate the phe-
nomenon known as a reverse merger, wherein a larger company merges into the smaller.
In the conventional situation, exemplified by a smaller company merging into the
larger, the controlling shareholders of the smaller company will be underwriters for
133 purposes and unable to sell except within the leakage provisions. When the larger
company merges into the smaller, the controllers of the smaller company become non-
controlling shareholders of the composite company and no registration would be
required for subsequent sales. See Schneider at 1342 n.58.
180 THE WHEAT REPORT at 266.
181 The central purpose of the Study and its recommendations was to utilize the
Commission's rule making power:
(a) to enhance the degree of coordination between the disclosures required by the
'33 and '34 Acts;
(b) to respond to the call for greater certainty and predictability; and
(c) to develop a consistent interpretative pattern which would help to assure that
appropriate disclosures are made prior to the creation of interstate public
markets in the securities of any issuer.
Id. at 8. See also Knauss, Disclosure Requirements -Changing Concepts of Liability, 24
Bus. LAw. 43, 45-48 (1968).
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been full disclosure to its shareholders in connection with the trans-
action, and if the issuing corporation.., is required to keep such
disclosures reasonably current through periodic reports under the
'34 Act, provisions such as Rule 133(c), (d) and (e) are no longer
appropriatel 82
Moreover, under the system as it adumbrates investor protection
and intelligent exercise of the franchise, rule 133 creates too many
problems which frustrate the purposes of the disclosure scheme.1 8 3
Consequently, the Study recommended that rule 133 be replaced
with a 33 Act registration procedure for mergers and sales of assets.
Necessary concomitants to such a repeal are the creation of a registra-
tion procedure to cover the 133 transactions which does not mitigate
the disclosures which may already be required; definite rules covering
the resale of securities by persons presently considered underwriters in
133 transactions; and guidelines to determine when an acquisition
does not constitute a public offering.18 4
Rule 133 is Defunct
In conjunction with its rapid implementation of the Wheat Re-
port's recommendations, the Commission accepted that report's conclu-
sion l 5 concerning rule 133 and has made certain proposals along the
lines recommended by the Study Group.8 8 Initially, rule 133 would
be revised to require that proposals for mergers, consolidations, reclas-
sifications of securities 8 7 or transfers of assets, as presently defined,
which are submitted for a shareholder vote, be registered. 88 The revi-
sion provides that a bare notice of a shareholder meeting for voting on
these proposals is not an offer or sale of a security if the shareholders
182 THE WHEAT REPORT at 271-72 (footnote omitted).
183 The Study felt that one of the important considerations which helped an acquir-
ing corporation in making a decision as to which form of acquisition to use was the
amount of disclosure required in each method. Id. at 270.
184 See THE WHEAT REPORT at 280-96; Appendix VI-1 at 14-22, 25-28; VII-1 - VII-4.
185 [I]hen a shareholder is asked to vote on the question whether or not his
company should be acquired by another and, accordingly, whether or not he
wishes to exchange his shares for the securities of the acquired company, an offer
of a security within the meaning of the '83 Act is made to him.
Id. at 272.
158 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5012 (Oct. 9, 1969).
187 The proposed revision notes that a reclassification of securities may very well
be exempt from registration by virtue of section 3(a)(9) or 3(a)(10) of the 33 Act. 48 Stat.
75 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(9) (voluntary exchange of shares between the
issuer and its shareholders); § 77c(a)(10) (1964) (court or agency approved reorganization).
188 The reason for the proposed change is that when such matters are submitted
to the vote of shareholders, each such shareholder is being asked to determine
whether or not he wishes to surrender the security he then holds for a new secu-
rity. In practical effect, therefore, the new security is being offered to him.
SEC Securities Act Release No. 5012 (Oct. 9, 1969).
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entitled to vote are given a prospectus at least 20 days before the
meeting s189
While the Wheat Group had recommended the creation of a new
form S-16 to bear the burden of the new registration requirements,190
the Commission felt that a revised edition of the existing form
S-14 would suffice. The revision provides, as does the present form, that
the prospectus consists of a proxy or information statement satisfactory
to the Commission's proxy rules. When a company is already subject
to the proxy rules, an S-14 filing will fulfill the requirement of filing a
proxy or information statement and also serve as the required prospec-
tus to be furnished the shareholders. 191
For purposes of section 5, it is necessary that the term "preceded
by a prospectus," as used in that section, include the transactions
covered by rule 133. Consequently, proposed rule 153A includes within
that term, 133 transactions. The term for 133 purposes means sending a
prospectus to all eligible voters prior to the designated voting date.192
Proposed rule 181 clarifies the meaning of "transaction not involv-
ing any public offering" as used in the private offering section 4(2).
When an issuer makes an offer and sale of securities in connection with
the acquisition of a business, there is no public offering of securities if
the offer and sale is made to not more than 25 offerees 193 who hold an
189 Communications which are permitted under the proxy rules prior to a proxy
statement are also allowed under revised rule 133. Rule 14a-12, 17 C..R. § 240.14a-12
(1970).
190 THE WHEAT REPORT at 280-82; Appendix VII-I.
191 Rule 14a-2(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(d) (1970) presently exempts from the coverage
of the proxy rules any solicitation involved in the offer or sale of securities which are
registered under the 33 Act. The Commission proposes to amend this rule so that the
exemption is not applicable to solicitations involved in the offer or sale of securities
registered but issued in a 133 transaction. Both the proxy rules and registration require-
ments will be applicable but duplicate filings will be unnecessary.
192 This latter provision eliminates a problem which was recognized by the Study
Group. When a company is acquired in a 133 transaction it becomes necessary to de-
termine the shareholders of record. Following the transaction but prior to issuance of
new certificates, shareholders may change through transfers. Consequently, the issuer
might be forced to check for such changes and send the transferees a proxy statement
with the new shares (§ 5(b)(2)). The Study believed this procedure to be unnecessary
for full and fair disclosure. THE WHEAT REPORT at 284-85. See also SEC Securities Act
Release No. 5010 (Oct. 8, 1969).
Concerning the delivery of prospectuses requirements, dealers are required to deliver
a prospectus in connection with the sale of a security subject to a registration statement.
The time limit can be either 90 days for a first offering or 40 days for a subsequent
offering. A proposed amendment to rule 174 would eliminate the 40 day requirement if
the issuer is subject to the reporting requirements of section 13 or 15(d) of the 34 Act.
Notice should also be taken of proposed rule 15c2-8 which requires that reasonable steps
be taken by broker/dealers to see that prospectuses are delivered.
193 The proposed rule defines "offeree" as including an individual, his spouse and
minor children, any trusts or estates they may have a beneficial interest in, any partnership
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interest in the acquired company and the form of the transaction is a
voluntary exchange of stock or one of the 133 methods of acquisition.
However, a subsequent reoffering by one of the offerees will convert
the entire transaction into a public offering and therefore subject the
shares to registration.194
Proposed rule 181 clarifies a giant problem area in connection
with business combinations. Prior to the Wheat Report, the favorite
exemptions utilized by acquiring companies were rule 133 and the
private placement exemption provided by section 4(2).195 The proposed
rule eliminates the uncertainty in this area to a greater degree than
the Wheat proposals for private placements in general. 196 The proposed
rules for private placements endeavor to transform subjective tests into
objective ones. The key to these proposals comes from the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Ralston Purina Co.19r to the effect
that the 4(2) exemption hinges upon "the need of the offerees for the
protections afforded by registration."'9 It is sufficient to note that the
private placement proposals'99 mark the demise of numerous "decorative
curlicues" in the federal securities law.200
of which substantially all the partnership interests are held by any of the above mentioned
people, and any corporation or organization of which substantially all of the shares
are held beneficially by any of these people.
The rule admits that it is not exclusive and circumstances may cause the "25 offeree"
criterion to be increased. It also warns that issuers have the burden of proving the
existence of the exemption and that persons receiving securities in a private offering may
be deemed underwriters upon resale of the securities.
194 See Appendix VI-1 at 25-26.
The Wheat Report recommended a proposed rule 169 which would exclude from
the 2(11) definition of underwriter the following in connection with a 133 transaction
which is submitted to a shareholder vote: the corporation, its officers and directors,
persons retained or employed by the corporation to solicit proxies, and any person who
transmits such proxy soliciting material. Neither would a corporation or its officers or
directors be so considered by recommending acceptance of the offer to exchange their
securities.
The Commission has yet to adopt this rule in its proposals but has asked for
comments concerning it.
195 48 Stat. 77 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964) (section 5 inapplicable to
transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering). See G. McCARTHE at 175-79; A.
CHOKA at 18-19.
196 THE WHEAT REPoRT at 152-247; Appendix VI-1.
In one particular area . . . a more definite standard . . . was thought to be
practicable. An issuance of securities for the purpose of acquiring a closely-held
going business can reasonably be considered as distinct from issues made for other
purposes .... [The proposed rule is] restricted to bona fide business combinations
and intended to provide assurance that registration is not required where the
offerees are limited to a designated number ....
Id. at 157-58.
197 346 U.S. 119 (1952).
198 Id. at 127.
199 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4997 (Sept. 9, 1969).
200 See, e.g., SEC v. Guild Films Co., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
819 (1960); Gilligan, Will & Co. v. SEC, 267 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896
(1959); In re Crowell-Collier Pub. Co., SEC Securities Act Release No. 3825 (Aug. 12, 1957).
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REPAIRS IN 34 AcT REPORTING
The Wheat Report acknowledges the fact that its proposals are
interdependent. In order for any of the 33 Act revisions to operate
efficiently, comparable repairs in 34 Act reporting requirements are
necessary. But even considering the viability of such corrections, their
effectiveness is questionable if the investor is unable to have the informa-
tion at his disposal. In short, "it sticks in one's craw to go to the trouble
of providing more meaningful information in reports filed with the
Commission unless those who need such information can get it quickly
and inexpensively." 20' The answer for more meaningful dissemination
lies in the Commission's microfiche 2 2 reproduction system. A microfiche
for its small size contains many pages of printed material.2 0 3 Its contents
are projected to a screen by means of a desk top reader, a machine
which is fairly inexpensive. 2 4 Equally inexpensive is the cost of micro-
fiche to subscribers2 5 and storage problems are greatly reduced. Since
the availability of SEC reporting documents will be greatly increased,
the onus will fall upon broker/dealers to see that greater accessibility
is afforded to investors.2 0 6
Under the 34 Act, an issuer files a series of reports starting with
the general registration form 10207 which is supplemented by annual
reports on form 10-K.208 Significant current events may be filed on
201 Wheat, The Disclosure Policy Study Of The SEC, 24 Bus. LAW. 33, 40 (1968).
202 A microfiche is a small rectangular sheet of film on which many pages of
typed or printed matter can be reproduced in a grid pattern.
THE WHEAT REPORT at 314.
203 1 have in my hand a microfiche of the entire old and new testament - 1445
pages in all - on a card no larger than about one and one half inches square.
The problem with this one is that reading technology has not yet caught up with
it. You have to use a microscope to read it. The best the current readers can
do ... is about half of Shakespeare on a four by six inch fichel
Wheat, supra note 201, at 41.
204 It is reported that the standard reading machine costs a little over $100. There
is a more expensive model which not only screens the microfiche's contents but is also
capable of printing desired pages. Id.
205The following comparison is made to the Commission's standard hard copy
reproduction service:
This service enables anyone to obtain a copy of any public document filed with
the Commission at a cost of 9 per standard page. The cost of a copy of a 60-page
document is $5.40. By contrast, a microfiche of the same document, individually
ordered, would cost 754. On a subscription basis . . . the cost per microfiche
varies between 504 and 230.
THE WHEAT REPORT at 315.
200 See Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1340, 1377-78 (1966).
See generally THE WHEAT REPORT at 319-23.
207 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (1970) (general form for registration of securities pursuant
to section 12(b) or (g) of the 34 Act).
208 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1970) (annual reports pursuant to section 13 or 15(d) of the
34 Act).
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form 8-K or 9-K20 but the use of these documents has not been heavily
subscribed to in the past.210 The Wheat Group made significant recom-
mendations for the present forms 10 and 10-K in order to make them
more timely, more informative and less repetitive.211 In conjunction
with these latter notions, the Study also advised that a new quarterly
report (10-Q) be instituted, replacing forms 8-K and 9-K. In addition
to its regular duties, this form would be required to be filed within
10 days after a significant acquisition or disposition of assets. 212
Of great importance to companies dealing with corporate take-
overs are the Study's recommendations concerning the merger proxy
statement.213 This statement has been held in high regard by the
sophisticated but sharply criticized by the average shareholder because
of its length and complexity.214 The solution to this problem lies in
a summarization of the vital data which could be attached to the
formidable statement. This summary, no longer than six or seven
pages, would contain in clear and concise language general information
as to the purpose of the solicitation. Also included would be the date
and place of the meeting, the title of securities entitled to vote, the
date of record, notice of appraisal rights and a brief description of the
securities offered. Additionally, the proposal to be voted upon would be
briefly outlined. Along with a summary of the tax consequences of the
transaction, the business of both parties to the merger should be identi-
fied. A description of the combination's new management is desirable
as well as a comparison of the companies' stock prices for an appropriate
period along with the net income, dividends and book values per share.
This summary should be correlated to an appendix which will be
attached to the document containing further details concerning each
item. The Wheat Group also recommends a similar procedure in con-
nection with a voluntary exchange of securities.215
209 17 C.F.R. §§ 249.308 (current reports); 249.309 (semiannual reports) (1970).
210 It is reported that the 8-K filings are quite irregular and that many investment
advisers and securities firms make no general use of these reports. See THE WHAT REPoRT
at 335-34.
211 Id. at 331-35. The recommendations are outlined in detail at 337-64.
212 These recommendations were accepted by the Commission with minor changes.
See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 8680, 8681, 8682, 8683 (Sept. 9, 1969).
213 The term is used in a broad sense to include proxy statements sent in connection
with a vote on a statutory merger, consolidation or sale of assets.
214 The Study reviewed a number of merger proxy statements which ranged
from approximately 60 to over 200 pages in length. The complaints of share-
holders concerning these massive documents are understandable.
THE WHEAT REPORT at 377.
2151Id. at 376-81. At this time the Commission has not implemented these recom-
mendations.
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CONCLUSION
The origins of federal securities regulation are traceable to an era
of severe economic dislocation encouraged in part by the widespread
manipulative practices of financial entrepreneurs. Comprehending the
plight of the average investor, Congress sought to assure the availability
of pertinent corporate data, in the hope that the intelligent evaluation
of new offerings would insure against history repeating itself to such
an awesome degree.
Although many yesterdays have vanished since the "great crash,"
the dynamics of the securities market itself mandates continuous pro-
tection against newer and more subtle forms of investor exploitation.
The increasing popularity of the cash tender offer and the concomitant
proliferation of defensive takeover tactics are indeed recent expressions
of such innovations, the tactical and legal dimensions of which have
been the subject of this note. Manifestly, while providing some of
the more dramatic illustrations of intercorporate exploits, both have
presented a virginal area, ripe for federal regulation.
Typically, congressional involvement was characterized by the
long-hallowed assurance that increased disclosure facilitates the intel-
ligent disposition of securities. To this end, Congress, appreciating both
the disruptive and salutary effects of take-over bids, "sought" to strike
a balance between adverse interests and "adopted" a policy of "strict
neutrality" which relegates the formulation of specific disclosure items
to the administrative expertise of the SEC. Echoing the harangue, the
SEC also assures that recent regulations are equally neutral in their
impact and simply place a premium upon the interest of the average
investor.216 Despite such euphuisms, the prophylactic nature of the
Williams Amendments emerges.
The reduction in the number of cash tender offers, compounded
by the resurging popularity of the stock exchange offer, would seem
to attest not only to the effectiveness of the new measures but also, and
perhaps more importantly, to the motivational factors, underlying their
enactment: the frustration of merger hyperactivity. Clearly, recent
Congressional 217 and administrative218 efforts evidence a general con-
cern that the merger wave is having a specious effect upon the economy;
216 34 SEC ANN. REP. 10 (1968).
217 See, e.g., The Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 411 et seq. (Dec. 30, 1969).
218 See, e.g., 1969 WIRTE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT ON PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPETITON,
115 CONG. RIc. 6350 (daily ed. June 16, 1969); 1968 WiITE HOUSE TASK FORCE REPORT
ON ANTrRUST, 115 CONG. REc. 5642 (daily ed. May 27, 1969).
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the policy-makers have sought, in several instances, to neutralize those
factors which give particular impetus to corporate combinations.
In the realm of corporate securities, this secreted ratiocination
would appear to have had the anomalous effect of compelling the
raider to resort to more traditional acquisition techniques. Whether
this "sterilization," i.e., replacing the tender offer with the stock ex-
change offer as a prelude to achieving control, will in fact impede cor-
porate combinations, of course, remains to be seen. However, one con-
clusion would seem evident, and that is a legislative imprimatur has
seemingly been affixed to the issuance of complex packages of corporate
securities in acquisition schemes.2 19 Hopefully, preexisting regulatory
devices will protect the investor from certain obvious abuses.
Militating against the stringencies of such ambivalence is the cor-
pus of decisional law likely to attend the eventual implementation of
the amendments. Taking Congress at its word, the Second Circuit, cog-
nizant of the substantial economic benefits which may result from the
infusion of dynamic management into a waning corporate structure,
has afforded the raider some freedom in placing required information
before the public. While some may deprecate the action as an unwar-
ranted intrusion into the legislative sphere, 2 20 it should be noted that
despite the comprehensiveness of the legislation, congressional circum-
spection has mandated such an approach. Indeed, if the impact of its
own words is to thwart the policy sought to be effected, one may only
suggest that Congress itself be more judicious in articulating its justifi-
cations and asserting its goals.
Nevertheless, it is suggested that such rhetoric be viewed in its
proper perspective. As investor protection is ideally the final considera-
tion, the expedition of the avowed purposes of both the Williams
Amendments and securities law generally requires greater emphasis
upon accessibility and comprehension in disclosure documents. While
the Wheat Report recommendations take significant strides in this
direction, the delay attending their final implementation seriously im-
pedes their effectiveness.
210 See Hamilton, supra note 34, at 295 & n.102. See generally Hearings, supra note
115, at 2367.
220 See Note, supra note 34, at 402-03.
